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The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into
After-Arising Technology:
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS
Broadly speaking, courts and commentators have offered two theories to explain the
relationship between the literal scope of a patent claim and after-arising technology (AAT),
i.e. technology that is not discovered until after a claim has been filed. The fixation theory
asserts that claim scope is and/or should be fixed on the date a claim is filed and that this
fixation makes it impossible for the claim to encompass AAT because a claim must grow in
some sense after the filing date in order to encompass AAT. In stark contrast, the growth
theory argues that literal claim scope does and/or should encompass AAT on a routine
basis and that literal claim scope therefore cannot be fixed on the date of filing.
Finding neither of these theories satisfying, either descriptively or normatively, this
Article rejects them. More specifically, it rejects a logical premise that both theories share,
namely that simultaneous fixation of and growth in literal claim scope is a logical
impossibility. The concept of the literal scope of a claim is ambiguous in several ways.
Courts can—and routinely do—fix one concept on the date of filing to achieve certain
goals, such as furthering public notice, while at the same time allowing a distinct concept to
grow and absorb AAT to achieve other goals, such as providing sufficient incentives. Every
time a court addresses whether AAT falls within the literal scope of a valid patent claim, it
necessarily constructs the things claimed by a patent and defines the nature of the meaning
that permits the claiming language to describe those things. Literal claim scope can
remain fixed and yet literal claim scope can grow to encompass AAT at the same time (in
different senses of the concept of literal claim scope, of course) provided that a court makes
tactical decisions in the course of constructing things and defining meaning.
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The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into
After-Arising Technology:
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS∗
[A] patent system must be related to the world of
commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The literal scope of a patent claim is not limited to the particular things
that an inventor actually discloses in detail in her patent application.
Rather, contemporary patent claims are peripheral claims. They use
descriptive language to mark the outer boundary of a category of inventive
things that extends well beyond the specific embodiments of an invention
that the inventor discloses. So long as the fictional person having ordinary
skill in the art of the invention (the PHOSITA) can make, use and
understand the structure of a non-disclosed embodiment at the time the
patent application is filed, a claim can describe that non-disclosed
embodiment, too. This rule of constructive disclosure is both descriptively
uncontroversial and normatively desirable if patents are to create
incentives and lure people into inventive and innovative pursuits. Without
this rule, either the incentives would be too meager, because competitors
could design around patent claims with only trivial investment, or the cost
of applying for patent protection and disclosing all conceivable
embodiments would be so great that the game (patent protection) would
frequently not be worth the candle (the cost of the application).
However, the terra firma of the constructive disclosure rule comes to
an end when a non-disclosed, allegedly infringing product or method
incorporates after-arising technology (AAT)—technology that is not
invented until after the filing of a patent application. Here, the alleged
infringer is an inventor, too (although she may not be recognized as an
∗

Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. I thank Barton
Beebe, Dan Burk, Jeff Leftsin, Mark Lemley, Mike Madison, Peggy Radin, Joshua Sarnoff, and
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College of Law. Finally, I thank Stacey Horvick, Richard Li-Dar Wang, and Megha Patel for their
assistance with research.
1
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d 965, 970
(C.C.P.A. 1965)).
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inventor under the patent laws and she may not seek patent protection). In
recent years, judicial and academic attention has been lavished on the
question of how far back toward the prior art a patent claim can reach,2 but
very little attention has been paid to the equally important question of how
far beyond the technology constructively disclosed by an inventor and into
future technology a claim can reach.
Broadly speaking, there are two competing theories that stake out
opposing doctrinal positions on the relationship between literal claim scope
and AAT. On the one hand, there is what can be called the fixation theory.
Both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and
patent commentators regularly argue that literal claim scope is incapable of
the post-filing growth that is required to encompass AAT because literal
claim scope is fixed on the date of filing. In gross, the argument is that
literal claims “cannot capture the later-developed technologies because to
do so would require the claims to be interpreted as they are understood at
some time after the filing date.”3 In part, advocates of this rule emphasize
the better public notice that results from claims whose meanings are fixed
at an early date.4 In part, advocates of the fixation theory also support their
position by arguing that control over AAT is normatively undesirable
because it is tantamount to control over something that the patent applicant
did not invent. “[T]he applicant must be the ‘inventor’ of the things
covered by the patent claims.”5 “Because, at the time of the . . .
application, . . . [those] skilled in the art [did not know] of the existence of
[the allegedly infringing AAT, the AAT] cannot be within the scope of the
claims . . . . To grant broader coverage would reward [the inventor] for
inventions he did not make.”6 The doctrine of equivalents unquestionably
allows a patentee to reach beyond literal claim scope to control some AAT,
but this flexibility has, through rhetorical feedback, only reinforced the
reifying effect of the fixation theory as it pertains to literal claim scope:
“Without a doctrine of equivalents, any claim drafted in current
2
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (refining the “teaching,
suggestion or motivation” test for nonobviousness).
3
Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 165 (2005); see also id. at 167–68 (“[R]ecent case law has emphasized the
temporal limitation on literal claim meaning, prohibiting the literal capture of later-developed
technologies.”).
4
See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101,
116 (2005) (arguing in favor of fixing a claim’s meaning on the date of filing because delaying fixation
until the date of infringement “would require the scope of patents to change over time” and would
mean that “a patent’s scope would not be fixed, but could differ from infringer to infringer as time
passes”).
5
Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters. Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J.,
concurring).
6
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Chiron Corp.
v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (stating that valid
claims should not “be construed broadly enough to encompass technology that is not developed until
later and was not enabled by the original application”).
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technological terms could be easily circumvented after the advent of an
advance in technology.”7
On the other hand, there is what can be called the growth theory. The
assertion that literal claim scope never expands after filing to encompass
AAT is plainly false as a descriptive matter.8 A number of high-profile
cases expressly sanction the reach of literal claim scope into AAT,9 and,
yet more troublingly, these cases are only the tip of an iceberg of ongoing,
post-filing growth in literal claim scope. The routine phenomenon of
blocking patents—successively issued patents that encompass the same
technological thing—implies that the scope of a patent claim grows over
time to encompass technologies that by definition are not known to the
PHOSITA at the time of filing.10 Given the run-of-the-mill nature of
blocking patents, some commentators assume that courts do not actually
follow the black letter rule that requires the fixation of claim scope at the
time of filing and that courts, instead, fix claim scope only at the time of
infringement.11
In terms of their pragmatic effects on the relationship between literal
claims and AAT, the two theories are opposites. The fixation theory holds
that the ex ante fixation of literal claim scope required for effective public
notice renders impossible the growth required for a claim to literally
encompass AAT. The growth theory holds that the pervasive ex post
growth in literal claim scope required to ensure sufficient incentives or to
allow coordinated development of technological prospects renders
impossible the ex ante fixation of literal claim scope.
Yet, despite the fact that the theories paint starkly different portraits of
patent protection, neither one provides a satisfying descriptive explanation
of how the contemporary patent regime actually seems to work. Patent
protection finds a middle ground somewhere in between absolute fixation
and unbridled growth. One way to explain this middle ground is through
judicial oscillation between the theories,12 but this explanation, too, seems
7
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(Rader, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
8
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
267–68 (1977) (noting that the scope of a patent is not commensurate with the scope of the inventor’s
discovery and that the “‘hornbook’ rule is very misleading”).
9
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 55–61, 65.
10
See infra notes 66–78 and accompanying text (illustrating the growth in literal claim scope
caused by blocking patents).
11
See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 295–97 (4th ed. 2007) (arguing that “[f]or purposes of infringement, . . . the [claim
language] is determined at the time of the alleged infringement”); see also Lemley, supra note 4, at 104
(discussing “the well-established principle that the meaning of the claim term for infringement
purposes [is] determined as of the time of infringement, not the earlier filing date” but mounting a
normative argument against the principle).
12
Contemporary patent doctrine has been called a patchwork of “entirely inconsistent visions of
the proper footprint of the [literally claimed] invention and how far an inventor can reach toward things
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to miss the mark in many cases. The curious puzzle of contemporary
patent protection is not that courts alternate between the fixation and
growth theories but rather that literal claim scope frequently seems to be
both fixed and growing at the same time. Claims routinely encompass
AAT, yet the growth required to achieve this end undermines neither the
stability of literal claim scope at the time of filing nor the capacity of a
claim to provide effective public notice.
To illustrate the inadequacy of both the fixation and growth theories,
consider a simple hypothetical involving successive inventors in the art of
coffee sleeves—the bands of material that slip onto disposable coffee cups
and insulate the drinker’s fingers from the heat of the coffee.13 An
inventor invents the clasping coffee sleeve, a strip of cardboard with
interlocking slots:

The inventor claims “an insulating band capable of encircling a disposable
cup.” After the inventor files her claim, two subsequent improvers make
additional contributions to the art of coffee sleeves. One improver invents
and patents a lightweight, insulating plastic, and she fabricates clasping
coffee sleeves from it. A second improver invents and patents a
nonobvious geometry for the coffee sleeve that allows the strip to be preshaped into a circular band and yet stored in a flat configuration that can be
easily made annular with one hand:

In these hypotheticals, a court would likely allow our original inventor’s
claim to grow to encompass the improvers’ AAT. However, this ex post
growth does not seem to disrupt or upend the meaning of the claim term
“an insulating band” that was fixed at the time of filing.
that come after the invention.” Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
27–28 (2005) (addressing the “footprint” of claims to “biospace” inventions).
13
These coffee sleeve hypotheticals are explored at greater length in infra Part II.D.
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Neither the fixation nor the growth theory adequately explains what
happens in easy cases like the coffee sleeve hypotheticals.14 The choice
between the fixation and growth theories demanded by the commentary on
the relationship between literal claim scope and AAT seems like a false
choice. It seems instead like courts can have their cake and eat it, too.
This both-and result is what this Article calls the fixation-growth paradox
of literal claim scope: literal claim scope can remain fixed at the time of
filing, yet it can (and routinely does) grow to encompass AAT
nonetheless.15
When what the extant models suggest should be happening does not
map onto what actually appears to be happening, the best approach is often
to change models, and that is what this Article argues patent judges and
commentators should do. This Article provides a theory that explains the
fixation-growth paradox. The theory both saves appearances, describing
more accurately than the dominant theories what happens in easy patent
cases involving allegations that AAT literally infringes, and provides the
tools that courts would need if they were to attempt to further fine-tune the
reach of literal claim scope into AAT so as to achieve normative goals.
The fixation and growth theories share a fundamental premise. Both
presume that the stabilization of literal claim scope required for effective
public notice is logically incompatible with the growth in literal claim
scope required for AAT to infringe. They differ only with respect to
whether fixation or growth prevails. This Article rejects this premise. It
outlines not one, but two mechanisms through which courts can and
routinely do resolve the fixation-growth paradox without contradiction so
as to enable simultaneous fixation and growth. The mechanisms are
deceptively simple. There are several ambiguities in the concept of the
literal scope of a claim, and courts can (and routinely do) fix one concept
on the date of filing to further public notice while at the same time
allowing a distinct concept to grow and absorb AAT. To explain these
mechanisms, this Article undertakes a meditation on the nature of a
peripheral patent claim and the ambiguities in the concept of literal claim
scope that pervade contemporary patent rhetoric.
Part II presents the fixation-growth paradox in greater detail, and it
frames the ambivalence-based theories used to explain the paradox pursued
in this Article. Because a peripheral patent claim uses descriptive language
to mark a set of things, patent lawyers and judges use the term “scope” to
invoke two distinct concepts: thing-scope—the size of the set of distinct
14

But cf. infra note 74 (refining the notion of an easy case).
The term is intended as a riff on the “temporal paradox” of enablement and literal infringement
put forward by Robert Merges. Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on
the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379–80 n.73 (1992). However, Merges’ theory of
the temporal paradox is a core example of a growth theory, positing that literal claim scope can grow to
encompass AAT only because it is not actually fixed on the date of filing. See infra note 65.
15
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types of things that a patent owner may prevent others from making, using
or selling—and meaning-scope—the generality of the language used in the
text of the claim. Additional drilling reveals further ambiguities nested
within both thing-scope and meaning-scope as well. Whether they realize
it or not, courts inevitably both construct things and define the meaning of
meaning whenever they talk about the reach of literal claim scope into
AAT. The choices that courts make in the course of constructing things
and defining meanings determine whether the literal scope of a peripheral
claim can remain fixed on the date of filing in one sense while expanding
after that date to reach into AAT in another sense.
Part III addresses thing construction. More specifically, it addresses
courts’ construction of the distinct thing-types that courts must tally in
order to determine thing-scope. Courts have some discretion in selecting
the granularity at which thing-types are defined, and how courts exercise
this discretion affects the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. When
courts construct thing-types coarsely rather than finely, they collapse larger
collections or genuses of discernable thing-tokens into a single thing-type.
Coarser thing-types, in turn, allow the inclusion of more AAT within the
fixed thing-scope of a claim. The property of the AAT that makes it afterarising is more likely to be overlooked, and the AAT is more frequently
labeled as belonging to the same thing-type already disclosed in the patent.
Drawing from a philosophical literature that grapples with the nature of
things, Part III concludes with a rough first pass on the descriptive inquiry
into the granularity at which courts actually do construct things.
Part IV addresses the meaning of meaning. Philosophers of language
argue that there are two plausible theories for explaining how descriptive
language achieves meaning. Roughly stated, denotational meaning, or
reference, depends principally on relationships between words and the
things in the world for which those words stand, whereas ideational
meaning, or sense, depends principally on relationships between words. In
everyday, unmediated communication, the difference between these
theories of meaning is largely without practical consequence, but the
convention of fixing the meaning of a claim on its historical date of filing
transforms it into a difference that makes a difference. If courts use
denotational meaning in claim construction, they must choose between the
fixation and growth theories because the fixation of meaning-scope entails
the fixation of thing-scope. However, if courts use ideational meaning,
they can anchor the meaning of a claim to the date of filing and still allow
the thing-scope of the claim to grow over time to encompass AAT because
ideational meaning permits play between thing-scope and meaning-scope.
As the previous part did, Part IV also concludes with a roughly hewn
descriptive argument, illustrating the different contexts in which courts
define the meaning of meaning differently.
Part V offers a brief normative argument about how to move forward
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once the import of thing construction and the meaning of meaning has been
put openly on the table. Courts should not search for principles that are
exogenous to patent policy to justify all of their decisions. Rather, things
and meanings should sometimes be viewed as policy levers that courts
manipulate to tailor the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.16 The
understanding of how courts manipulate things and meanings presented in
this Article therefore provides both conceptual tools that allow courts to
identify normatively relevant sub-categories of AAT and instrumental tools
that allow courts to sanction the reach of literal claim scope into some, but
not all, of those categories. In sum, this Article rejects the stark division
between “the realm of philosophy” and “the world of commerce” that has
been endorsed by the Supreme Court in patent law.17 It undertakes an
inquiry into the former in order to lay bare the tools that courts can, do and
should use to adjust patent doctrine to serve the interests of the latter.
II. THE FIXATION-GROWTH PARADOX
This Part lays out the fixation-growth paradox of literal claim scope in
detail and frames the remainder of the Article as a demonstration of how
courts resolve the paradox without contradiction by either constructing
things or defining meaning.
A. The Scope of a Peripheral Claim
Peripheral claims are descriptive texts. They specify the necessary and
sufficient criteria for the inclusion of a thing within the set of things that a
patentee can exclude others from, inter alia, making, using, and selling.18
Only if the claim language describes (or, in patent lingo, “reads on”19) a
thing does the claim encompass the thing.
Peripheral claims earn their name because they are supposed to give
the public notice of the full extent of the claim, right out to its “outer
boundar[y].”20 Giving notice to the public of claim scope reduces
uncertainty and minimizes the cost of navigating a patent-filled
16
See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (advocating that courts use economic
reasoning to generate industry-specific variation in their application of patent law); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (same).
17
See supra text accompanying note 1. But cf. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002) (suggesting an approach to the doctrine of equivalents that is
attuned to philosophical concerns about language and things in stating that “the nature of language
makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application”).
18
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). Patent claims can describe either objects (machines, manufactures
and compositions of matters) or events (processes). Id. § 101. This Article uses the term “things”
loosely to encompass both. Cf. infra note 206 (noting that events can be defined in an object-like
fashion by describing them in terms of properties of the spatiotemporal regions in which they occur).
19
Amhil Enters. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
20
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 27 n.4 (1997).
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21

technological landscape. The way in which peripheral claims perform
this public notice function becomes more apparent after considering an
alternative technique of marking a patentee’s interest: the central claim. In
a central claiming regime, a publicized prototype marks the exemplary
embodiment of the patentee’s interest, and courts determine claim scope on
a case-by-case, as-needed basis by querying how similar an allegedly
infringing thing is to the prototype. Unlike central claims, peripheral
claims are said to mark the metes and bounds of a patent because they
facilitate the ex ante identification of the outer limit of the patentee’s
interest.22
Two distinct concepts populate the everyday understanding of the
literal scope of a peripheral claim among patent lawyers and judges.
Peripheral patent claims are at the same time describing language and sets
of described things, and this duality carries over into how the concept of
claim scope is used in patent rhetoric.23 Patent lawyers sometimes measure
claim scope as a function of the meaning of the claim’s descriptive
language.24 In fact, courts often use scope in a fashion that makes it
synonymous with word meaning. “[T]he full scope of [a term’s] ordinary
meaning” is, and is nothing more than, the term’s ordinary word
meaning.25 Here, scope is a quality of language that tracks the generality
or specificity of word meaning.26 This concept of the scope of a peripheral
21
Potential competitors must choose whether to license patent rights, design around them, use the
prior art, or abandon efforts in the technological field altogether. These choices are less costly and less
risky when there is clear notice. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996)
(noting the public benefit of increased predictability of patent scope).
22
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917). But cf. infra
text accompanying notes 231–33 (noting that this analogy misleadingly reifies literal claim scope).
23
Claim scope has yet other meanings to other audiences. Economists equate claim scope with
market power, and thereby allow claim scope to turn on both the things within claim scope in a patentlawyerly sense and the things outside of it (in addition to consumer preferences). See generally
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 103–07 (2004) (distinguishing legal and
economic conceptions of claim breadth and explaining variations among the economic conceptions).
Property law academics may treat the notion of claim scope as pertaining to the scope of exclusive
rights that a patent owner has vis-à-vis any given thing described by the claim. See, e.g., JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 420–33 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing issues pertaining to the scope of an easement). The patent lawyerly concept of claim scope
is more akin to the concepts of scale and configuration in real-property discourse than to the concept of
scope. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE. L.J. 1315, 1332–35 (1992) (discussing
the efficient scale of property in land in relation to the scale of the activities conducted thereon); Henry
E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131,
144–61 (2000) (discussing a scattered configuration of property boundaries).
24
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(analyzing the extent to which claim construction is a legal, factual, or mixed issue); R. Polk Wagner &
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial
Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s wavering
approach in claim construction).
25
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
26
See D. ALAN CRUSE, MEANING IN LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS AND
PRAGMATICS 50 (2000) (portraying greater generality in meaning as “a more extensive area of quality
space”).

2008]

THE REACH OF LITERAL CLAIM SCOPE

503

claim is the claim’s meaning-scope. Patent lawyers in other instances
assume that literal claim scope is not a quality of language but a settheoretical construct made of distinct, possible things. In other words,
scope is “the number of competing products and processes that will
infringe the patent.”27 This concept is thing-scope. Thing-scope measures
the size of the set of distinct things described by the claim. The larger the
set is, the broader the thing-scope of the claim. Importantly, the inventory
of the number of distinct things required to measure thing-scope does not
depend on the number of instances of tangible things existing in the actual
world at any given time. Thing-scope is unaffected by a patentee’s
decision to manufacture ten or ten thousand widgets.28 Thing-scope grows
only with an increase in the inventory of the distinct thing-types known to
fall within the patentee’s property interest, not the number of thing-tokens
that exist in the actual world.29 Except in the calculation of damages,
references to “things” or “sets of things” in patent law invoke types, not
tokens.
Meaning-scope and thing-scope are distinct concepts. Meanings and
things are, metaphysically speaking, apples and oranges.30 Furthermore,
there is no single, correct concept of claim scope. Both meaning-scope and
thing-scope are integral to patent practice. At the end of the day, patentees
are interested in having exclusive rights to a claim (set of things), not
exclusive rights to a claim (language). The latter is closer to what a
copyright affords an author than to what a patent grants an inventor.
However, the claim (language) is critical because it is the legally codified
demarcation of the claim (set of things).
B. The Black Letter Doctrines of Fixation
Black letter patent doctrine places restrictions on both meaning-scope
and thing-scope that are fixed on or pegged to the date on which a claim is
filed. Claim construction requires fixation of meaning-scope, and the
disclosure doctrines ensure that thing-scope is commensurate to the
27
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839 (1990).
28
But cf. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39 (1975) (“A claim is an
abstraction and generalization of an indefinitely large number of concrete, physical objects.”).
29
The notion that a full inventory of the set of things within thing-scope is possible is misleading
in two ways. First, the identity of a thing is malleable. See infra Part III (exploring thing construction).
Second, the set is likely to be infinite. Even the modulation of a single, scalar property can create an
infinite number of distinct things. While claims must be definite and bounded, see 35 U.S.C. § 112
para. 2 (2006) (requiring claims to “distinctly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention”), a bounded claim requires only that the PHOSITA can draw a
line to distinguish claimed and unclaimed things. It does not limit thing-scope to a finite set.
Nonetheless, thing-scope can be relatively larger or smaller even if thing-scope is infinite. See PAUL R.
HALMOS, NAIVE SET THEORY 93 (1960) (presenting Cantor’s Theorem in set theory).
30
But cf. infra Part IV.A.1 (explaining that the denotational meaning is a set of possible things).
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PHOSITA’s understanding of the things disclosed in the specification.
Courts use claim construction to determine the word meaning of claim
language.31 The more general the word meaning, the larger the set of
things the claim describes, and the more valuable the claim is to the
patentee.32 The inevitable vagueness and ambiguity in word meaning
makes claim construction a highly contentious and often outcomedeterminative undertaking.33 Because a lack of clarity in word meaning
undermines the public notice that justifies the peripheral claiming regime
to begin with,34 courts have developed two rules to reduce uncertainty in
word meaning.
First, courts have anointed the PHOSITA as the official arbiter of
world meaning.35 The PHOSITA’s ordinary and customary understanding
of language is dispositive of meaning-scope. The same word can mean
different things to different audiences—a “small gap” likely means
something different to a construction engineer than it means to a
nanotechnologist—so it is important to know whose understanding is
legally controlling.
Second, recognizing that meaning can evolve over time, courts also
root the meaning-giving PHOSITA on a specific date in history—the date
on which a claim is filed.36 As the Supreme Court noted in the context of
statutory interpretation, “[i]t does not follow that when a newly invented or
discovered thing is called by some familiar word, which comes nearest to
expressing the new idea, that the thing so styled is really the thing formerly
meant by the familiar word.”37 A “small gap” may mean something
different to a construction engineer on an earlier date when building
materials can only be fabricated with a significant margin of error than it
does on a later date when fabrication machines work on smaller tolerances.
31

See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (reviewing the
basic principles of claim construction).
32
General claim language can also be problematic for a patentee if it broadens the claim so that it
reads on the prior art. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (codifying novelty and nonobviousness). Because
this Article focuses on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT which, by definition, is not prior art, it
presumes that enlarging claim scope is in the patentee’s interest.
33
Cf. CRUSE, supra note 26, at 51–52 (distinguishing ill-definedness—the problem of
“designat[ing] a region on a gradable scale”—and laxness—the habitual application of a word “in a
loose way”—as two subdimensions of vagueness); id. at 108 (noting that ambiguity involves words
with two or more “antagonistic readings”).
34
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313.
36
Id. Actually, there are two candidates that vie for coronation as the date of fixation: invention,
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), and filing, Schering
Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Because the Federal Circuit recently
sought to defuse the tension by noting that in most instances the “time of invention” is “the effective
filing date of the patent application,” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313, this Article presumes that meaningscope is fixed on the date of filing. However, the opposite presumption would not alter the arguments
presented.
37
Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116, 147 (1863).
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These two fixation rules do not eliminate the problems of vagueness
and ambiguity. Among other issues, courts famously disagree about the
relative importance of dictionary definitions and contextually inflected
word usages in a patent’s disclosure when assessing the legally binding
meanings of the words that make up claims.38 Nonetheless, the pinning of
meaning-scope to the historically fixed PHOSITA makes word meaning
relatively clearer and fosters public notice of claim scope.
Enablement and written description are the two disclosure doctrines
implicated in fixation of thing-scope on the date of filing.39 Enablement
requires patent applicants to disclose enough information in the
specification that accompanies the claims to allow the PHOSITA to make
and use the full scope of the claim without undue experimentation at the
time the claim is filed.40 Written description requires that the patent
applicant disclose enough information to demonstrate “invention” or
“actual possession” of the full scope of the claim to the PHOSITA at the
time the claim is filed.41 The possession standard is a judicial work in
progress, but it seems to require roughly that the patent applicant disclose
enough information to demonstrate conceptual possession of the physical
structure of the invention.42 If patent applicants fail to satisfy either
doctrine, their claims are not valid.
It is the inherent knowledge attributed to the PHOSITA that gives rise
to the ability of the constructive disclosure to extend beyond the literal
disclosure. To stave off the possibility of information overload, patent
applicants are encouraged not to disclose what the PHOSITA already
knows, to disclose literally only a limited number of embodiments, and to
rely on the inherent knowledge of the PHOSITA to extend those literal
embodiments into a broader disclosure.43 For example, even if the inventor
38

See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006). Best mode is also a disclosure doctrine, id., but it does not
have a commensurability requirement and thus does not fix claim scope.
40
See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
41
Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
42
See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The disclosure
must allow one skilled in the art to visualize or recognize the identity of the subject matter purportedly
described.”). Courts have only recently applied the written description requirement to claims filed with
the original application, as opposed to claims amended during the course of prosecution. See id. at
979–81 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (discussing how written
description has only recently come to be viewed as its own doctrine, distinct from enablement, when
applied to original claims). Whether courts should apply written description in addition to enablement
to originally filed claims is the subject of considerable controversy. E.g., Janice M. Mueller, The
Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 633 (1998) (arguing that written description as applied to original claims is
an inappropriate “super-enablement” requirement).
43
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 923 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[C]laimed
subject matter ‘need not be described in haec verba’ in the specification to satisfy the written
description requirement.”) (quoting In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); see also
Hybridtech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A] patent
39
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of a widget discloses only a seven-sided widget that is two inches long and
made of wood, she is entitled to a peripheral claim to a “seven-sided
widget” that encompasses seven-sided widgets of any length and of any
material that the time-bound PHOSITA could conceive (under written
description) and make and use (under enablement) upon reading the patent
disclosure. How far constructive disclosure extends beyond literal
disclosure is affected by a number of variables, including the predictability
of the art and whether a large quantity of experimentation would be
required to produce a particular embodiment.44 Most importantly for the
present purposes, however, is the date on which the PHOSITA is rooted.
Because the knowledge attributed to the PHOSITA in a technological field
may grow over time, a textually identical disclosure may not demonstrate
enablement or possession of the claim’s full scope to the PHOSITA of an
earlier date, but may nonetheless do so for a PHOSITA positioned later in
time.45
The disclosure doctrines shape patent protection in two distinct ways.
First, they are information-forcing rules. An incentive to disclose
justification of patent law depicts patent protection as one side of a quid
pro quo: the state grants private rights to exclude from the claimed
invention to the inventor, and the inventor must disclose to the public
information that the patentee otherwise could have attempted to keep
secret.46 The disclosure doctrines ensure that the inventor fulfills her
disclosure obligations and does not strategically withhold information.
Second, the disclosure doctrines restrict the permissible thing-scope of a
patent claim by mandating that the thing-scope be quantitatively
“commensurate with” or “no broader than” the disclosure at the time of
filing.47 If the inventor claims a set of things that is larger than the set that
[disclosure] need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”).
44
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (listing factors that are considered in
determining whether undue experimentation would be required to produce an embodiment of an
invention in light of the information in the disclosure). The predictability of the art and the quantity of
experimentation are important in determining whether a disclosure enables an embodiment of an
invention or whether the embodiment is unenabled, scope-actualizing AAT. See infra note 194
(defining scope-actualizing AAT). However, predictability is not relevant to understanding how courts
sculpt the reach of literal claims into AAT through thing construction, see generally infra Part III, and
the meaning of meaning, see generally infra Part IV.
45
See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
46
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1974) (holding that trade secret
law is not preempted by federal patent law because of a conflict with the incentive to disclose
justification of patent protection).
47
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that
written description requires “claims [to] be no broader than the supporting disclosure”); Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that enablement ensures that claim
scope remains “commensurate with” the disclosure). Many formulations of the disclosure doctrines
note that valid claims need only be “reasonably” commensurate to the disclosure. See, e.g., In re
Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 690 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., concurring). Because reasonableness may
provide wiggle room to hide the policy choices that courts make when they construct things and define
meaning, this Article does not address it.
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she has taught the PHOSITA how to make and use without undue
experimentation at the time of filing, the claim is invalid for lack of
enablement. Similarly, if the inventor claims a set of things that is larger
than the set of which she has demonstrated possession at the time of filing,
the claim is invalid for lack of a sufficient written description. If an
inventor is not strategically withholding information and cannot enable or
demonstrate possession of the claim’s full thing-scope on the desired date
of filing, she can either delay the filing date until she can satisfy the
disclosure requirements or reduce the scope of her claim so that it is
commensurate with the disclosure.48
C. The Overt Conflicts Between Fixation and Growth
The previous subsection outlined the black letter law in the claim
construction and disclosure doctrines that requires both the meaning-scope
and the thing-scope of a claim to be fixed in some manner on the date that
the claim is filed. This subsection examines both how courts have applied
these doctrines and how commentators have characterized courts’
applications. In some cases, courts interpret the doctrinal mandate for
fixation as precluding the expansion of literal claim scope after the date of
filing that is required for the claim to encompass AAT. These holdings
exemplify the fixation theory: fixation trumps growth in literal claim
scope. In other cases, however, courts have expressly recognized that
literal claim scope can and should grow after the date of filing so as to
encompass AAT. Judges and commentators have depicted these holdings
as examples of the growth theory in action: regardless of what black letter
law suggests should happen, growth trumps fixation in literal claim scope.
In claim construction, the fixation theory posits that the fixation of
meaning-scope makes it impossible for literal claim scope to encompass
technologies that were not known to the PHOSITA at the time the claim is
filed. In effect, the fixation theory holds that the fixation of meaning-scope
at the time of filing entails the fixation of thing-scope at that time.49 For
example, consider the Federal Circuit’s concurring opinion in Superguide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises.50 The Superguide court construed the
meaning of the claim term “regularly received television signal.”51 The
allegedly infringing technology used digital signals, but analog signals
were the industry norm and thus the only signals regularly received on the
48
If the patent applicant fails to enable or demonstrate possession of any embodiment, reducing
claim scope is not an option. See Glass, 492 F.2d at 1232–33 (invalidating claims under the
enablement doctrine because the specification did not enable any embodiment within the claims).
49
See, e.g., Cotropia, supra note 3, at 165, 167–68.
50
Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J.,
concurring). But cf. infra note 230 (arguing that Superguide is unusual in that it involves a temporal
index).
51
Superguide, 358 F.3d at 876.
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date that the claim was filed. Presuming that a post-filing shift in the set of
claimed things is tantamount to an impermissible post-filing shift in
meaning, the concurrence concluded that the fixation of meaning-scope on
the date of filing prevented the claim from reading on devices receiving
digital signals.52 The majority opinion in Schering Corp. v. Amgen also
exemplifies the fixation theory brought to bear on claim construction.53
Schering, the patentee, claimed recombinant DNA molecules coding for “a
polypeptide of the IFN-α type.” After the claim was filed, new variants of
IFN-α unknown at the time of filing were discovered. The Federal Circuit
held that fixation of the meaning-scope of the claim left the AAT outside
of the patent’s literal scope as a matter of law. “Because, at the time of . . .
application, neither [the inventor] nor others skilled in the art knew of the
existence of, let alone the identity of, the specific polypeptides now
identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes cannot be within the scope
of the claims.”54
In contrast to these cases in which the fixation theory explains the
outcome of the court’s claim construction, however, there are cases in
which courts recognize that the allegedly infringing device incorporates
AAT and that there may be literal infringement. For example, the majority
opinion in Superguide concluded that the literal language of the claim
could describe the post-filing regular receipt of digital signals.55 The
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons,
Inc. also reaches a similar conclusion.56 In Laser Alignment, the allegedly
infringed claim included the limitation “a collimated narrow beam of
light.”57 The allegedly infringing technology used a laser to produce a type
of light beam that was not invented until after the claim had been filed.
Like the concurrence in Superguide, the district court held that the fixation
of meaning excluded AAT from claim scope as a matter of law and that a
post-filing change in the thing-scope to which the claim language referred
entailed an impermissible post-filing change in meaning.58 The Seventh
Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the fixation of meaning-scope
on the date of filing did not prevent the claim from reading on AAT.59 As
the Federal Circuit has stated, “[t]he law . . . does not require that an
52

Id. at 897 (Michel, J., concurring).
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1349–50, 1353–54; see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring) (“I think the proper approach . . . is to address cases of new
technology by construing claims, where possible, as they would have been understood by one of skill in
the art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology
. . . .”).
55
Id. at 881.
56
Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 871–73 (7th Cir. 1974).
57
Id. at 869 n.1.
58
Id. at 871.
59
Id. at 872–73.
53
54
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applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and possible
future embodiment of his invention.”60 To explain these outcomes,
commentators have suggested that the principle of ex ante fixation has
been abandoned and the principle of ex post growth has been adopted in its
place.61
Although it is thing-scope rather than meaning-scope that is at issue,
there is a parallel conflict between the fixation and growth theories in
courts’ applications of the enablement and written description inquiries.
The disclosure analyses are doctrinally anchored in time on the filing
date,62 but precisely how they are anchored—i.e., precisely what must be
commensurate with the PHOSITA’s understanding of the disclosure on the
date of filing—is a point of contention.
The variant of the fixation theory at work in disclosure cases posits
that the full scope of the claim at the time of infringement must be
commensurate with the constructive disclosure of the specification at the
time of filing. Under the fixation theory, thing-scope must remain
commensurate to the time-bound PHOSITA’s understanding of the
disclosure from the time of filing through the end of the patent’s twentyyear term.63 By definition, AAT cannot be fully enabled and possessed
according to the information that the patentee discloses on the filing date,64
so a claim’s thing-scope is not commensurate with the disclosure if it
literally encompasses AAT.
In contrast, the variant of the growth theory at work in the disclosure
cases concludes that only the full thing-scope of the claim at the time of
filing must be commensurate with the constructive disclosure of the
specification. In other words, only the thing-scope of the claim at the time
of filing needs to be enabled for and possessed by the PHOSITA, and
thing-scope is permitted to grow over time thereafter. Under this
interpretation, the disclosure doctrines are utterly indifferent to the post60

SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).
See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 295–97 (arguing that “[f]or purposes of infringement,
. . . the [claim language] is determined at the time of the alleged infringement”); Lemley, supra note 4,
at 109 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit in Laser Alignment allowed the claim to encompass AAT only
because it delayed the fixation of meaning until the time of infringement).
62
See supra note 40–41 and accompanying text.
63
See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating a
claim under the written description doctrine “[b]ecause [the allegedly infringing AAT] technology did
not even exist at the time of the . . . filing, the record conclusively supports that the Chiron scientists
did not possess and disclose this technology”); cf. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural
Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (implying that the contemporary interpretation of the
disclosure doctrines generally obviates the need for the reverse doctrine of equivalents because it
prevents literal claims from encompassing AAT in the first place).
64
If the specification both enables and demonstrates possession of an allegedly infringing
technology in all of its particularities on its date of filing, the patent constructively discloses the
technology, and the technology cannot be AAT. Cf. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314
F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a method not developed until after a patent was filed
cannot be disclosed by the patent).
61
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filing expansion in thing-scope that is triggered by the absorption of AAT
into literal claim scope.65 In short, growth trumps fixation as the
commensurability requirement places no restriction on the ability of literal
claim scope to expand and encompass AAT.
D. The Suppressed, Paradoxical Reality of Both Fixation and Growth
Both the fixation and growth theories offer logically coherent models
of how patent doctrine could, in theory, deal with the relationship between
literal claim scope and AAT. As the previous subsection demonstrates, the
critical commentary on the relationship between literal claim scope and
AAT has been a debate about which of these two theories does or should
prevail.
However, this either-growth-or-fixation framework of the commentary
fails to capture what actually occurs in the day-to-day reality of
contemporary patent practice. Where the fixation and growth theories
mandate an election of either fixation of or growth in literal claim scope,
contemporary patent law seems to achieve a both-and solution on a regular
basis. This is the fixation-growth paradox of literal claim scope: literal
claims regularly expand to encompass AAT, yet courts usually do not raise
a red flag to warn of impermissible growth in claim scope because neither
the stability of literal claim scope nor the efficacy of the claim’s public
notice is threatened.
The simplest way to illustrate that literal claim scope is routinely
perceived as remaining fixed while at the same time expanding so as to
reach into AAT is to highlight the everyday occurrence of physical
blocking patents (blocking patents)—claims in earlier- and later-issued
patents that both read on the same technology.66 That an inventor from a
later generation (improver N+1, or simply N+1) can claim a patentable
improvement on the existing technology developed by an inventor from an
earlier generation (inventor N, or simply N) is a straight-forward idea.67
65
The classic case expounding the growth theory is In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (holding that enablement at the time of filing is unaffected by later changes in the state of the
art). The idea that the enablement doctrine requires scrutiny of claim scope only at the time of filing is
what underlies the “temporal paradox” of enablement and infringement proposed by Robert Merges.
See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 295–97; Merges, supra note 15, at 379–80 n.73.
66
There are two types of blocking patents. Physical blocking patents involve successive patents
that both read on the same thing-token. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 695 (1886).
Economic blocking patents involve claims that read on physically distinct parts of a thing-token that
consumers desire as a whole. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1010 n.87 (1997) (explaining how patents for distinct yet
complimentary goods held by different inventors may block each owner from obtaining maximum
economic benefit). To make the point that literal infringement of AAT necessitates some form of postfiling growth most clearly, the discussion in this Part equates blocking patents with physical blocking
patents. However, even economic blocking patents mandate a weak form of post-filing growth in
literal claim scope. See infra note 128.
67
Cf. ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 6:8 (5th ed.
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However, it is less intuitive that inventor N and improver N+1 may have
blocking patents and that N+1 may not be able to practice her invention
without N’s permission. The counterintuitive nature of blocking patents is
attributable, in part, to the weakness of N+1’s patent position. Patent law
affords N+1 only a right to exclude others from practicing the patented
improvement; it does not afford her an affirmative privilege to use her
improvement.68 Yet, the counterintuitive nature of blocking patents can
also be traced to the unexpected strength of N’s position. Whenever there
are blocking patents, the literal scope of N’s earlier or “dominant” claim
reaches beyond what N actually invented and encompasses the things
produced by N+1’s later or “subservient” invention.69 N+1’s improvement
literally infringes N’s claim despite the fact that the improvement is, by
definition, not known to the PHOSITA who has read the disclosure of N’s
patent on its date of filing.70 In other words, whenever there are blocking
patents, the scope of the dominant claim grows over time in some sense
and reaches into AAT.71
For example, consider two blocking-patent hypotheticals involving
coffee sleeves. Inventor N invents the clasping coffee sleeve, a strip of
cardboard with interlocking slots that, when assembled, insulates a coffee
drinker’s hand from a hot disposable cup.72 Presuming that N is the first
inventor of a coffee sleeve, she can disclose her clasping coffee sleeve and
lay claim to “an insulating band capable of encircling a disposable cup.”
After N files her claim, assume also that two improvers from generation
N+1 realize that the clasping coffee sleeve actually invented and disclosed
by N is not the pinnacle of coffee sleeve technology. The first N+1 invents
and patents a lightweight, insulating plastic, and she fabricates clasping
coffee sleeves from it. The second N+1 invents and patents a nonobvious
geometry for the coffee sleeve that allows the strip to be pre-shaped into a
circular band and yet stored in a flat configuration that can be easily made
circular with one hand (while the coffee drinker has the hot cup of coffee
2004) (explaining that Jepson claims are frequently used to claim improvements to existing
technologies).
68
See supra text accompanying note 18.
69
Fields v. Conover, 443 F.2d 1386, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
70
See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (codifying the nonobviousness requirement). Because
nonobviousness is measured at “the time the invention was made,” id., but claim meaning is fixed on
the date the claim is filed, see supra note 36 and accompanying text, a limited exception to this rule
exists if the subservient invention comes after the invention of the dominant invention but before the
date on which a patent to protect the dominant invention is filed.
71
Technically, the existence of blocking patents is not critical to the fixation-growth paradox.
The paradox can arise whenever N’s claim grows to encompass N+1’s technology and N+1’s
technology is inventive vis-à-vis N’s disclosure. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 43–45 (discussing
constructive disclosure). The paradox exists even if N+1 does not seek a patent.
72
For a picture of N’s invention, see supra text accompanying note 13. The coffee sleeve is a
commonly used technology for teaching basic patent principles, in large part because of its simplicity
and familiarity. See, e.g., MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 11, at 36–48.
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73

in the other).
If the patentee N were to sue either of these improvers N+1 for literal
infringement, what would a court do? These hypotheticals are designed to
be easy cases:74 courts would allow N’s claim to encompass the N+1s’
AAT. In other words, courts would not use the fixation theory. (If they
were to use the fixation theory, there would no literal infringement.)
Furthermore, unless prompted to do so, the defendants would be unlikely
to raise growth-related arguments favoring noninfringement and invalidity.
The inclusion of AAT within literal claim scope does not seem to change
the meaning of the claim or unmoor it from its fixed meaning at the time of
filing before the N+1s discovered their improvements.75 Neither the
fixation theory nor the growth theory can explain the fixation-growth
paradox that characterizes these easy cases.
Post-filing growth literal claim scope without significant disruption of
claim stability or public notice pervades the patent regime in many easy
cases.76 There is nothing special about coffee sleeves. The hypothetical
does not involve exceptional facts. To the contrary, the coffee sleeve
hypotheticals can be extrapolated to almost any technology.77 They
73

For a picture of this second N+1’s improvement, see supra text accompanying note 13. The
Patent and Trademark Office deemed U.S. Patent No. 5,826,786 (filed Oct. 27, 1995), which claims
N+1’s new geometry, to be nonobvious in light of U.S. Patent No. 5,425,497 (filed June 20, 1995),
from which the illustration of inventor N’s clasping coffee sleeve is taken.
74
But cf. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 662–69 (1981) (arguing that interpretive construction is required even in cases that are easy
in the sense of being doctrinally uncontroversial in the relevant legal community).
75
The statements about what courts and litigants would do are blatant predictions. There is no
long history of patent litigation in the art of coffee sleeve technology and patent doctrine concerning
AAT as a whole is far from settled, so there is no airtight answer about what the law is in these cases.
However, the coffee sleeve hypotheticals are employed, in part, because of the author’s belief that the
predictions reflect a strong consensus among scholars of patent law about the likely outcome.
(Importantly, this consensus about the outcome is not indicative of a doctrinal consensus about why the
cases come out this way.) The consensus on the after-arising materiality hypothetical is explicit. See,
e.g., Feldman, supra note 12, at 9–10 (offering a “one embodiment” rule for enablement when applied
to the property of materiality in mechanical inventions); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard,
Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947, 1976–77 (2005) (presuming that a claim to a tennis racket can encompass tennis
rackets made from after-arising materials if materiality is not expressly recited as a limitation in the
claim). Express and on-point prognostication about cases like the after-arising geometry hypothetical,
however, is not as common. One reason it is difficult to find examples of cases similar to the afterarising geometry coffee sleeve hypothetical is that such cases are viewed as run-of-the-mill examples
of literal infringement and therefore are not litigated.
76
Indirect evidence of the prevalence of AAT within literal claim scope can be found in the patent
doctrines that would be irrelevant if claims never literally encompassed AAT. See, e.g., O’Reilly v.
Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1853) (invalidating claims to “principles” in the abstract); Scripps Clinic &
Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discussing the reverse
doctrine of equivalents).
77
Because coffee sleeve technology is likely to be considered a discrete innovation industry, the
growth in literal claim scope triggered by the inclusion of AAT is not limited to cumulative innovation
industries. But cf. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 190 (arguing that industries characterized by discrete
innovation do not generate much AAT). However, the descriptive argument that AAT occurs in all
industries does not undermine the existence and normative significance of the distinction between
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illustrate situations in which AAT falls within literal claim scope without
fanfare—situations that may not even be recognized as involving AAT
because no disruption to claim stability seems to be implicated.78 These
situations may not involve radical technological breaks with the past, but
the fixation theory does not purport to draw the difficult line between what
does and does not constitute a technological paradigm shift or to exclude
from literal claim scope only AAT that exceeds some threshold of social or
technological importance.
E. Resolving the Paradox
This Article grapples with the fixation-growth paradox not by insisting
that stability be privileged over growth, or vice versa, but by rejecting a
premise that structures both theories. Both theories posit that accepting the
statements “literal claim scope is fixed on the date of filing” and “literal
claim scope grows over time after the date of filing” as true produces a
logically impossible patent regime. This Article instead posits that both
statements can be true because together they are an equivocation—they
mislead by using an ambiguous phrase, namely “literal claim scope,” twice
without specifying that each instance of the phrase carries a different
meaning.79 The concept of literal claim scope in some of its senses can and
does remain fixed as of the date of filing, even as the concept expands in
other senses in the manner required for a claim to encompass AAT. The
paradox of fixed yet expanding literal claim scope can thus be resolved
without contradiction by recognizing the multiplicity of concepts that
populate the everyday, patent-lawyerly use of the term “literal claim
industries characterized by discrete and cumulative innovation. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 27,
880–82 (arguing that claim scope should be narrower in cumulative innovation industries). Cumulative
innovation industries are those in which major, direction-shifting and/or path-opening technological
innovations that build on earlier innovations occur at temporal intervals that are significantly less than
the term of a patent. After-arising improvements of the more ordinary, refinement variety occur
regularly in both types of industries.
78
There is Federal Circuit precedent for dismissing the existence of AAT even when the allegedly
infringing technology is a patented improvement covered by a subservient patent. In Al-Site Corp. v.
VSI International Inc., the court addressed a patent infringement suit involving hangers for displaying
eyeglasses, and its ability to find literal infringement hinged on the fact that the allegedly infringing
hangers did not constitute after-arising technology. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l Inc., 174 F.3d 1308,
1320–22 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (using a jury verdict of equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents to find
literal infringement as a matter of law under 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 because, inter alia, the accused
device did not embody AAT). Ignoring the improvement patent on the defendant’s technology, id. at
1321–22, the court dismissed the existence of AAT by zooming in, framing the defendant’s technology
as nothing more than the “holes” that exist in the hanger, and stating that “holes do not constitute an
after-arising technology.” Id. at 1322. By framing the physical part of the defendant’s device that
corresponded to a particular claim limitation so narrowly, the court framed the after-arising aspect of
the technology out of existence. Similarly, in the coffee sleeve hypothetical, a court might just say
bands generically are not AAT, ignoring the relevant after-arising geometry that clearly makes the
defendant’s band after-arising.
79
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 604 (4th ed. 2000)
(defining “equivocal” as “[o]f uncertain significance”).
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scope.” One way in which to frame the goal of this Article is simply to
tease out the different meanings that, without adequate differentiation, are
commonly invoked when courts and commentators talk about literal claim
scope.
The equivocation-based response to the paradox is, in theory, a simple
one, but there is a redundancy that makes the project more complex. There
is not a single mechanism for resolving the paradox. There are two
independent mechanisms, each of which implicates a different category of
AAT. One mechanism focuses on the nature of things and the way in
which thing-scope can be fixed in one sense and yet expand in another to
encompass AAT. The other addresses an ambiguity in the meaning of
meaning. Under one definition of meaning, but not the other, meaningscope can remain fixed on the date of filing while allowing thing-scope to
expand over time to encompass AAT. Parts III and IV address each of
these mechanisms in turn.
III. THING CONSTRUCTION
Although claim construction is a well-known practice in patent
infringement litigation, this Part argues that courts must also regularly
engage in thing construction in patent cases involving allegedly infringing
AAT. The distinct things that serve as the metric of thing-scope are
conceptual, not physical, entities. They are types, not tokens, and therefore
they do not have fully formed, objective existences prior to patent
infringement proceedings. Before courts can determine whether thingscope has remained fixed or grown over time, they must initially construct
the thing-types that are required to calculate thing-scope.80 Thing
construction holds the key to explaining one mechanism through which the
fixation-growth paradox operates to achieve a both-stability-and-growth
result in the disclosure doctrines. In other words, thing construction
exposes one reason why in some cases it is not necessary to elect either the
80
This Part does not argue that courts construct the tangible or extensional instances of infringing
things. It offers only a weak construction thesis. The construction lies in human cognition: courts
construct the thing-types that classify and give order to their understanding of what the infringing
thing-tokens are. This weak construction thesis is deeply influenced by the work of both Mike
Madison and Mark Kelman. Madison has argued that it is important to be conscious of the
construction of not only legal doctrine but of things as well in order to understand and shape
intellectual property law. See generally Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and
Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005) (categorizing and evaluating five methods of
thing-making). But cf. infra note 239 (disagreeing with Madison that courts uniformly employ a things
by nature approach in patent law). Kelman makes the argument more sweepingly. Courts must engage
in “interpretive construction” to turn the events to which law is applied into something courts can
analyze doctrinally. Interpretive construction can be outcome determinative because it produces the
premises upon which courts unleash doctrinal logic (or “rational rhetoricism” in Kelman’s terms). See
Kelman, supra note 74, at 591–93 (discussing two phases of legal argument: interpretive construction
and rational rhetoricism). Following Madison’s lead, this Part merely illustrates that courts also
produce things through interpretive construction before they unleash rational rhetoricism.
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fixation theory or growth theory when explaining how the disclosure
doctrines work. Certain thing constructions, but not others, allow the
fixation of literal thing-scope at the time of filing and yet still permit the
literal claim to encompass AAT when it is subsequently discovered.81
Part III.A initially offers a proof of principle. Using a simplistic
hypothetical to make its point clearly, it demonstrates how courts can use
thing construction to make a claim read on AAT without triggering postfiling expansion of thing-scope. Courts have discretion to construct thingtypes in either a coarse- or fine-grained fashion. Through a coarse-grained
thing construction, courts throw large genuses of distinct infringing thingtokens into a single conceptual thing-type basket, thereby masking the
existence of the growth that a claim undergoes when it encompasses AAT.
The coarser courts make thing-types during thing construction, the larger
the number of after-arising improvements that can infringe without
triggering an expansion in thing-scope.
Part III.B then takes a rough first pass at understanding the conditions
under which courts actually regulate the reach of literal claim scope into
AAT by constructing things either finely or coarsely. A philosophical
literature addressing the nature of things posits a distinction between the
properties that a thing possesses intrinsically and those that it possesses
extrinsically—a distinction that can be traced to a physical or microstructural essentialism about what things really are. This distinction
explains some, but not all, of courts’ thing constructions. Courts rely on
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties to place a hard
limit on how finely they construct things. However, it is not clear whether
courts use the distinction to place a hard ceiling on how coarsely they
construct things.

81
The importance of thing construction can be most easily seen by assuming for the sake of
argument that the disclosure doctrines require fixation of thing-scope at the time of filing. If one
accepts the growth theory for thing-scope—i.e., if one accepts that only the thing-scope of the claim at
the time of filing needs to be commensurate with the disclosure, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text—then there is less riding on thing construction. However, universal acceptance of the growth
theory does not provide an intuitively satisfying explanation for the way in which literal claims reach
into AAT in all situations. In some instances, thing construction provides an explanation that is better
at saving the appearances of contemporary patent practice and discourse. See infra text accompanying
notes 136, 146. Furthermore, even if one accepts a growth theory for thing-scope in all cases, thing
construction may still be important in explaining the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. If one
accepts that growth in thing-scope entails growth in meaning-scope, and one adopts the fixation theory
as applied to meaning-scope, then thing construction offers the only mechanism to allow AAT to fall
within the literal scope of a claim with a fixed meaning. If thing-scope remains fixed at the time of
filing, then meaning-scope, too, remains fixed at that time. Thus, if a court deploys thing construction
so that the claim can encompass AAT without adding new thing-types to the claim, there is no need to
worry about post-filing shifts in meaning-scope. Cf. infra Part IV (arguing that the meaning of
meaning determines whether the fixation of meaning-scope entails the fixation of thing-scope).
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A. Coarse-Grained Things and the Masking of Growth in Thing-Scope
Courts construct the things encompassed by a patent claim when they
categorize the infinite array of infringing tokens of things into the discrete
conceptual baskets or thing-types that are tallied to determine the claim’s
thing-scope.82 Thing construction is simply the identification of the subset
of the thing-tokens’ properties that are relevant to the identities of the
tallied thing-types.
For example, assume a simplistic claim to “paper” by the first inventor
of paper. Assume also a specification that discloses to the time-bound
PHOSITA, either literally or constructively, sheets of paper with a wide
variety of properties including sheets of paper in letter and legal sizes,
sheets of paper that are dyed both yellow and blue with different
chemicals, and sheets of paper inside and outside of computer-printer
paper trays.83 How should a court calculate the claim’s thing-scope?
Artificially restricting the inquiry to the embodiments recited above, does
the claim describe one, two, four or eight types of things? If there are two
infringing sheets of paper on my desk that are as identical as imaginable,
yet one is dyed yellow and the other blue, are they instances of distinct
types of things or are they duplicates of the same type of thing? By
answering these questions, courts construct things in patent law and
establish the metric by which thing-scope is measured.
Thing construction determines which properties of an allegedly
infringing technology are and are not overlooked in defining the identity of
a thing-type.84 For example, assume that a first court treats all sheets of

82

See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (defining thing-scope). Categorization is not
unique to patent law. It is a fundamental aspect of cognition: the human mind routinely “breaks down”
the complexity and continuity of physical reality into discrete categories or types that can be more
readily stored, managed and processed. See DICTIONARY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE: NEUROSCIENCE,
PSYCHOLOGY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LINGUISTICS, AND PHILOSOPHY 41 (Oliver Houdé ed., 2004)
(defining categorization). Thing construction is analytically distinct from the categorization that occurs
in claim construction and literal infringement. The latter tasks, which are the usual suspects in the
analysis of categorization in patent law, involve categorization in what might be considered its forward
direction. They start with a category defined by the claim language and query what belongs in the
category by identifying the criteria needed for inclusion in the category (claim construction) and
determining whether a given thing-token satisfies those criteria (literal infringement). The construction
of things, however, runs the categorization process in reverse. Given a set of infringing technologies,
what are the categories that one should create in order to house them? Although the claim language
determines the extent of the group of infringing things that must be categorized, it does not provide the
criteria that define the conceptual thing-type baskets into which those infringing things should be
sorted.
83
The term “properties” is used here more or less in its colloquial sense. Properties are simply
“the attributes or qualities or features or characteristics” that things possess. Chris Swoyer, Properties,
in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.1, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
properties/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (offering an overview of the nuances in the notion of the
properties of a thing).
84
The process of categorization in its reverse direction, see supra note 82, is inherently reductive,
and the construction of thing-types that contain thing-tokens therefore erases many differences.
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paper, regardless of the particular chemicals with which they are dyed, as
instances of a single thing-type. The court erases the property being dyed
with a specific chemical from the legal identity of the claimed things
during thing construction. Sheets of paper that possess the property being
dyed with chemical X are thrown into the same conceptual thing-type
basket as sheets of paper that have the incompatible property being dyed
with chemical Y. However, a second court might not overlook the property
being dyed with a specific chemical when constructing thing-types. It
might treat sheets of paper that are dyed with different chemicals as
distinct thing-types. In tallying thing-scope, the two different courts use
different metrics for measuring the thing-scope of the claim to “paper.”
The first court concludes that the thing-scope of the claim to “paper” is
smaller than the second court does, but only because it performs the
measurement with a larger unit of measure.
More broadly, the number of properties overlooked or erased during
thing construction can be measured in terms of the coarseness or fineness
of the granularity at which things are constructed. The more coarse the
grain of the thing-types is, the larger the number of properties erased and
the larger the set of discernable instances of things that is thrown into the
same conceptual thing-type basket.85 However, the more coarsely grained
the thing-types are, the smaller the final, quantified tally of the claim’s
thing-scope and the fewer the distinct conceptual baskets of thing-types
that need to be counted. In contrast, fine-grained thing-types involve the
erasure of fewer properties, the inclusion of smaller sets of discernable
instances of things within a single type, and the tallying of more thingtypes to determine thing-scope.
Thing construction may seem esoteric because, unlike claim
construction, it is irrelevant to the outcome of many cases. Why should
one care whether thing-scope is twice as large numerically if the units of
measurement are half as big? It is as though the first court describes a
distance as one mile and the second court describes the same distance as
two half-miles.
Whenever an allegedly infringing technology is
constructively disclosed by a patent specification, the quantification of
thing-scope, and thus the construction of things, presents a purely
academic issue. If the allegedly infringing thing is enabled and possessed
in all of its particularities at the time of filing, courts do not need to
construct things. However, when the allegedly infringing technology is
AAT, the manner in which courts construct things is not a purely academic
exercise. Rather, it is dispositive of whether the thing-scope of a literal
claim can both remain fixed at the time of filing and grow to encompass
Categorization assigns thing-tokens to thing-types with reference to some, but not all, of the properties
that the tokens possess.
85
Cf. infra text accompanying note 106 (defining “indiscernibles” as a term of art).
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AAT at the same time.
To understand the importance of thing construction in cases involving
AAT, it is initially critical to understand that the AAT implicated in the
fixation-growth paradox can always be defined in terms of after-arising
properties for preexisting things. Such AAT is after-arising because N+1
invents a new property or set of properties for a thing that N has already
The
invented and described, either literally or constructively.86
hypothetical coffee sleeves introduced in the previous Part are after-arising
because, in relation to the original inventor’s disclosure of the clasping
coffee sleeve, they possess the after-arising property of either being made
from an after-arising plastic or being folded in an after-arising geometry.87
An allegedly infringing instance of a sheet of paper may be after-arising in
relation to the disclosure of the patent that claims “paper” because the
sheet has the property of being dyed green with an after-arising chemical.
Similarly, an allegedly infringing sheet of paper could be after-arising
because it has the property being in the paper-tray of an after-arising
computer printer.88 Considered in all of their particularities, neither a sheet
of paper that is dyed green with an after-arising chemical nor a sheet of
paper in the paper tray of an after-arising printer could have been
constructively disclosed by the patent claiming “paper.” This conclusion is
inherent in the definition of after-arising.89
Here is the payoff of reframing AAT in terms of after-arising
properties for preexisting things: thing construction can mask the postfiling growth in literal thing-scope that is required for a claim to
encompass AAT if it employs a coarse-grained construction and erases the
property that marks the AAT as after-arising. This erasure renders the
after-arising property irrelevant to the identity of thing-types and the
distinctions between them. When the after-arising property is not a
definitional property of the tallied thing-types, the allegedly infringing
AAT can be thrown into a preexisting conceptual thing-type basket created
for the constructively disclosed embodiments. The claim’s thing-scope
need not expand over time for the AAT to infringe. In contrast, if the
property that makes the allegedly infringing technology after-arising is a
property that defines the thing-types tallied to measure thing-scope, then
thing-scope cannot encompass the AAT and, at the same time, remain
86
Perhaps some AAT can only be understood as a thing with entirely new properties. However,
not only is such radical AAT unusual (if in fact it exists), it is unlikely to be implicated in the fixationgrowth paradox because it will rarely fall within an earlier inventor’s claim.
87
See supra text accompanying note 72–75 (presenting the coffee sleeve hypotheticals).
88
It is difficult to conceive of an appropriate hypothetical based on the final example of a
property for a sheet of paper considered above, namely the property having a particular size. See supra
text accompanying note 83. An after-arising size that is not constructively disclosed by the
specification in the patent claiming “paper” is difficult to imagine.
89
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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fixed as of the time of filing. The introduction of a new, distinct thing-type
within literal claim scope makes the tally of things described by the claim
at the time of infringement larger than the tally of things that the
PHOSITA at the time of filing recognizes as enabled and possessed in light
of the disclosure. When thing construction produces thing-types at a
relatively fine level of granularity, no both-and solution is possible. Either
stability must trump growth, or growth must trump stability.
Consider again the two courts that adopt different metrics for
measuring the thing-scope of the “paper” claim, the first identifying yellow
and blue paper as distinct thing-types, and the second overlooking the
difference in the property of color and classifying the yellow and blue
sheets of paper as two instances of the same thing-type.90 If the allegedly
infringing product is AAT in the form of a sheet of paper with the property
being dyed green with an after-arising chemical, and if the disclosure
doctrines require thing-scope to be stabilized on the claim’s filing date,
then thing construction determines whether thing-scope can remain fixed
and still encompass the AAT. The first court (which constructed things in
a relatively fine manner) must conclude that the green paper is not within
the fixed thing-scope of the claim. The green paper is an instance of a
distinct thing-type not constructively disclosed in the specification, and the
thing-scope of the claim cannot grow after the date of filing to encompass
it. Thus, either the “paper” claim is invalid under the disclosure doctrines
or there is no literal infringement. In contrast, the second court (which
constructed things in a relatively coarse manner) should conclude that the
after-arising green paper is within the fixed thing-scope of the claim. The
color that the sheet of paper is dyed is irrelevant to the identity of a thingtype; the AAT is treated as the exact same type of thing that was
constructively disclosed in the patent specification. Here, the “paper”
claim is enabled and possessed, and the AAT literally infringes.
The same story about thing construction and its importance to the
reach of fixed thing-scope into AAT can be told using the property being
in the paper-tray of an after-arising computer printer rather than the
property being dyed green with an after-arising chemical. Whether this
AAT can fall within the thing-scope of a claim to “paper” that has been
fixed on the date of filing also depends on whether the court constructs
things finely—viewing paper inside and outside of paper trays as distinct
types of things—or coarsely—overlooking the property of being in a paper
tray—when identifying the thing-types that must be tallied to measure the
claim’s thing-scope.
Couched in the language of equivocation,91 the both-and result of
fixation of thing-scope at the time of filing and growth in thing-scope after
90
91

See supra text accompanying note 84.
See supra text accompanying note 79.
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that date to encompass AAT is possible because the term “thing-scope” is
ambiguous. The distinct things that comprise thing-scope can be defined at
coarser or finer levels of granularity. By choosing a coarse-grained
definition of things as the legally relevant definition, courts can mask the
growth in thing-scope that is appreciable only with a fine-grained
definition. The ambiguity between coarse and fine things allows courts to
focus on coarse-grained thing-scope when monitoring commensurateness
under the disclosure doctrines and render legally irrelevant whatever
growth occurs in different, more finely parsed metrics of thing-scope.
Thing-scope (coarse-grained) is fixed, and thing-scope (fine-grained)
grows. It is thus the negative implication of a coarsely defined thing that
resolves the fixation-growth paradox without a logical contradiction.
Whenever a property is not relevant to the conceptual basket or thing-type
in which a thing-token belongs, that property may reflect technology not
developed until after a claim is filed and yet no change in the claim’s
thing-scope occurs when the claim encompasses the AAT.
In sum, thing construction can determine whether a literal claim with a
thing-scope fixed on the date of filing can remain valid while
encompassing AAT. Coarse-grained thing-types explain one mechanism
through which courts can achieve both the fixation of thing-scope at the
time of filing and the growth required for a claim to literally encompass
AAT.
B. What Courts Do
At what granularity do courts actually construct things in
contemporary patent practice? How do they distinguish the bundle of
properties that they use to define thing-types from the remaining properties
that they overlook? These questions are of practical import in patent law
because, as explored in the previous subsection, the level of granularity at
which things are defined determines whether a claim can have a thingscope that has been fixed on the date of filing and, at the same time, still
encompass AAT. In some situations, thing construction determines
whether literal claims can achieve both stability and growth.
There are no statutes specifying the rules that courts should use to
establish the granularity of things, so the parameters controlling thing
construction are entirely within the hands of the judiciary. One possibility
is that courts have unfettered discretion in thing construction. Perhaps the
stability of literal claim scope is nothing more than a conceptual shell
game, and courts routinely make growth in thing-scope appear or disappear
through a sleight-of-hand shift in granularity. Such discretion would in
turn allow courts to extend or truncate the reach of literal claim with a
fixed thing-scope into AAT by validating or invalidating, respectively,
claims under the commensurability analysis of the disclosure doctrines. At
the opposite end of the spectrum, another possibility is that courts feel
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bound by a strict set of rules to always classify certain properties as
relevant to the identity of a thing-type and other properties as irrelevant.
Perhaps the properties of a thing that make it the type of thing that it is are
defined by nature or convention before patent law comes into the picture.
Furthermore, perhaps courts are bound by these rules either consciously or
unconsciously. If this is true, then courts do not, as a practical matter,
exercise any discretion at all during thing construction.
This subsection presents one candidate for an extra-legal distinction
that could, in theory, be guiding courts’ decisions during thing
construction: the distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties
of a thing. Embodying a structural or physical essentialism about what
things are and reflecting the way in which things are commonly discussed
in everyday language beyond patent rhetoric, the distinction makes explicit
what are arguably shared and wide-spread intuitions about things. The
intrinsic properties of a thing are those properties that are wound up with
making a thing the thing that it is, whereas the extrinsic properties of a
thing are the properties that are not wound up in the identity of the thing.
If the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties were to guide
courts during thing construction, courts would always use the intrinsic
properties of a thing to define thing-types, but they would never use the
thing’s extrinsic properties to define thing-types.
This subsection tests the hypothesis that the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic properties determines courts’ decisions during thing
construction against the Federal Circuits’ holdings in cases involving
allegations that AAT falls within literal claim scope. It concludes that the
hypothesis is clearly consistent with the case law regarding the role of
extrinsic properties in thing construction. Courts appear to be firmly under
the sway of an essentialist understanding of things during thing
construction insofar as they never use extrinsic properties to define thingtypes. However, no conclusion can be reached with respect to whether the
inverse is true and whether courts always use intrinsic properties to define
thing-types during thing construction.
1. The Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties of a Thing
Some philosophers interested in the nature of things posit a
metaphysical distinction between the properties a thing possesses
intrinsically and those second-class properties it merely possesses
extrinsically—its intrinsic and extrinsic properties for short.92
92
See generally Robert Francescotti, How to Define Intrinsic Properties, 33 NOÛS 590 (1999)
(arguing that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction remains a useful philosophic tool); I.L. Humberstone,
Intrinsic/Extrinsic, 108 SYNTHESE 205 (1996) (exploring the distinctions between the extrinsic and
intrinsic properties); David Lewis, Extrinsic Properties, 44 PHIL. STUD. 197 (1983) (critiquing a
proposal for distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic properties); Theodore Sider, Intrinsic Properties, 83
PHIL. STUD. 1 (1996) (distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic properties); Peter Vallentyne,
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Philosophers who are interested in the distinction work to define and
defend it because they believe that it explains “legitimate intuitive
considerations” about the nature of the things that exist in the world.93 In
gross, the intuition is that not all of the properties of a thing-token are
equally tied up with making that thing-token the type of thing that it really
is.
Only some of a thing’s properties—the intrinsic ones—derive entirely
from what the thing is. “A thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the
way that thing itself, and nothing else, is.”94 An intrinsic property of a
thing is “a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be
going on outside of itself.”95 Intrinsic properties can be traced back to the
thing itself without any other explanation or contribution.
In contrast, other properties—the extrinsic ones—are dependent upon
the context of the thing or its relationships to things other than the thing
being examined.96 Residually defined, as they usually are, extrinsic
properties are the properties that are “not entirely about that thing” and that
“may depend, wholly or partly, on something else.”97
Archetypes of the extrinsic properties are relatively uncontroversial:
the properties of being an uncle or being six meters from a rhododendron
are extrinsic properties of Sam and my pencil, respectively.98 These
properties describe properties of a thing-token that follow, at least in part,
from something other than the thing itself. Sam is an uncle because his
brother or sister has a child. A pencil is six meters from a rhododendron,
in part, because of the nature of the rhododendron at issue.99 Although the
identification of intrinsic properties can be more controversial, being six
meters tall, being circular and having an internal structure with two parts
Intrinsic Properties Defined, 88 PHIL. STUD. 209 (1997) (defining intrinsic and extrinsic properties);
Stephen Yablo, Intrinsicness, 26 PHIL. TOPICS 479 (1999) (discussing intrinsic properties). Although
the terms “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” are used adjectivally to modify properties for the sake of
convenience, they are meant to evoke a local rather than global concept of intrinsicality. This local
concept is most commonly expressed through the adverbial formulations intrinsically and extrinsically
possessed properties. See Humberstone, supra at 206–07 (explaining the global/local distinction).
93
Humberstone, supra note 92, at 205. Because the philosophical work involves flushing out a
commonplace intuition, explanations of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties often
start from the assumption that people are already familiar with the basic notion of an intrinsic property.
See, e.g., Yablo, supra note 92, at 479 (“You know what an intrinsic property is . . . .”). Philosophers
are also motivated to establish and defend the distinction because it proves to be a useful tool in a
variety of philosophical projects that are not relevant here. See, e.g., Humberstone, supra note 92, at
207 (listing projects).
94
Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.
95
Yablo, supra note 92, at 479.
96
Cf. Humberstone, supra note 92, at 209–27 (suggesting that a relational property is a distinct
sub-type of an extrinsic property).
97
Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.
98
Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 83.
99
Extrinsic properties may be admixtures to varying degrees. Lewis, supra note 92, at 197
(“[B]eing a brother has more of an admixture of intrinsic structure than being a sibling does, yet both
are extrinsic.”).
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are intrinsic in most circumstances.
The shape of a thing is often taken
as a paradigm of an intrinsic property: that the pencil on my desk is four
inches long, that it is six-sided in cross-section and that it is pointed on one
end are properties that the particular pencil has in and of itself.101
Materiality, too, is conventionally viewed as an intrinsic property.102 The
fact that my pencil is made of wood and graphite is true because of the way
the pencil, and nothing else, is.
The payoff of subscribing to the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties comes from being able to tell what a thing actually is
on a metaphysical level. Not only are intrinsic properties solely about the
way a thing-token is, but the nature of a thing “is given by the totality of its
intrinsic properties.”103 Thingness is equated with the totality of intrinsic
properties. A tally of a thing’s intrinsic properties is both necessary and
sufficient to identify the thing-type to which the instance of the thing
belongs. Inversely, a tally of its extrinsic properties is not required. Thus,
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties leads to the
conclusion that the intrinsic property being four inches long is constitutive
of the thing that my pencil is but the extrinsic property being six meters
from a rhododendron is not.
Proponents of defining things in terms of their intrinsic but not
extrinsic properties argue that the distinction merits recognition and study
because it legitimizes strong, shared intuitions about the nature of what
things are. To illustrate the strength of these intuitions, they invoke two
common-sense concepts about things that can be explained only by
reference to the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction (or, at least, some distinction
akin thereto): the concepts of duplicates versus indiscernibles and real
change versus mere Cambridge change.
It is perfectly intuitive to talk about two thing-tokens as duplicates.
Sentences like “This pencil over here is a duplicate of that one over there”
and “These two sheets of paper are duplicates” are commonplace. Such
talk is possible, however, only because of the intuitive nature of the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Without such a
distinction, no two things in the actual world could be labeled as
duplicates. Two thing-tokens are intuitively viewed as duplicates if they
are perceived as being “exactly alike” as things.104 Yet, no two thingtokens existing in the actual world at the same time can be exactly alike in
all of their properties. At a minimum, they are located in different
positions in space. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
100

See id. (listing shape as an intrinsic property).
But see generally Bradford Skow, Are Shapes Intrinsic?, 133 PHIL. STUD. 111 (2007) (arguing
that it is difficult to defend shape as an intrinsic property in every instance).
102
See Lewis, supra note 92, at 197 (listing internal structure as an intrinsic property).
103
Id.
104
See id.
101
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properties sheds light on the properties that two thing-tokens must share to
be duplicates. Intrinsic properties are those properties with respect to
which duplicates may not differ; things are duplicates if and only if they
share all of their intrinsic properties.105 Because size is an intrinsic
property, a cube with one-inch sides is not likely to be perceived as a
duplicate of a cube with two-inch sides. Residually, extrinsic properties
are those properties that may differ between duplicates. Because relation
to a rhododendron is an extrinsic property, a pencil that is six meters from
a rhododendron can be a duplicate of a pencil with the same size, shape,
and materiality that is seven meters from the rhododendron. Importantly,
two things that are duplicates are not indiscernibles—they do not share all
of their properties, both intrinsic and extrinsic.106 Duplicate pencils that
are six and seven meters distant from a rhododendron are discernibly
different, but they are still duplicate things because distance from a
rhododendron is a mere extrinsic property of the pencil-as-thing. In sum,
without the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, it is
gibberish to talk about things that are duplicates, and all that can really be
said about two instances of things is that they are discernable.
The intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction is also useful to differentiate
between two intuitively different types of change that things undergo. A
thing that undergoes a change in an intrinsic property is said to experience
real change while a thing that undergoes a change in an extrinsic property
is said to experience mere Cambridge change.107 When my four-inch long
pencil is sharpened so that it is only three inches long, the pencil has
undergone real change. It is a different thing after the change has
happened; it is not a duplicate of its former self. Similarly, if my pencil
were miraculously to transmute from being a wooden pencil to being a
plastic pencil, the change would be real change. (To avoid the pitfalls of
positing such miraculous change, the idea of mere Cambridge change can
be modified to mere Cambridge contingency.)108 In contrast, when a
pencil is moved one meter closer to a rhododendron (or, even more
strikingly, a rhododendron is moved one meter closer to a pencil) or when
Sam’s sibling has a child, the thing in question (either the pencil or Sam)
has undergone a much weaker kind of change. This weaker type of change
still makes a thing-token take on properties that it did not have beforehand
105

Id.
DAVID LEWIS, ON THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS 62–63 (1986). Indiscernability is the tighter
bond between two objects. It is a bond so tight that it is impossible to formulate common sense
examples of indiscernible things in the actual world, as two material objects cannot occupy the same
location in space simultaneously.
107
Humberstone, supra note 92, at 207–09.
108
See id. at 209 (explaining that a Cambridge contingency “arise[s] whenever some predicate
true of [an object] x might not have been”). According to this formulation, a property is extrinsic if, in
the contingent situation that a thing does not have the property, there is no “genuine respect” in which
the thing is different. Id.
106
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and lose others that it previously had, but, in an intuitively important way,
the thing is still the same thing that it was before the change occurred.109
The pencil is still intrinsically the same pencil; Sam is still intrinsically the
same person. This weaker type of change is mere Cambridge change.
Again, without the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties,
the idea that there is a difference in the change that Sam undergoes when
Sam grows taller and when Sam’s sibling has a child would be an illusion.
Although the concepts of duplicates and mere Cambridge change can
be used as rules of thumb or litmus tests for sorting a thing’s intrinsic
properties from its extrinsic properties, they do not provide an analytical
definition for the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction. They do not
explain an unknown concept in terms of simpler, known ones, because
there is no way of defining duplicates or mere Cambridge change other
than in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. All three concepts form
a “tight little family of interdefinables.”110 The concepts of duplicates and
mere Cambridge change only underline the value of the intrinsic/extrinsic
property distinction in explaining our basic intuitions about the world. The
more important to understanding the world of things these two concepts
are taken to be, the stronger the case for distinguishing intrinsic and
extrinsic properties.111
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties should not be
confused with the Aristotelian distinction between essential and accidental
properties, respectively.112 Extrinsic properties do not map onto accidental
properties on a one-to-one basis. For example, size is an accidental yet
intrinsic property of a tree. More importantly, Aristotle’s notion of
accidental and essential properties hinges on the existence of natural kinds
in a way that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties does
not. In the Aristotelian schema, an a priori hierarchy of differences
divides the world into sets of things called natural kinds. Each natural kind
has a “real” definition or a set of essential properties, namely the
differences that structure the a priori hierarchy, and part of the search for
understanding involves identifying the natural kinds and their “real”
definitions or essential properties.113 Inversely, sets of things that are not
109

There are instances in which the association of extrinsic properties and mere Cambridge
change fails because extrinsic properties are admixtures. See Lewis, supra note 92, at 197. For
example, being taller than b is an extrinsic property of thing a (provided that a is not a part of b and b
is not a part of a) in that it is not a property that a has in and of itself. However, a can lose this
property either through real change in a shift in a’s height or through mere Cambridge change in a shift
in b’s height. Humberstone, supra note 92, at 208.
110
Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.
111
Cf. id. (arguing that “giv[ing] over the entire family as unintelligible and dispensable . . .
would be absurd”).
112
See J. Michael Dunn, Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations, 60
PHIL. STUD. 177, 181 (1990) (criticizing “a tendency . . . to conflate intrinsic properties and essential
properties”).
113
See Michael R. Ayers, Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds, 78 J. PHIL. 247, 250–53

526

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:493

natural kinds do not have essential properties. It makes no sense to search
for the essential properties of the thing cup on a book, because cups-onbooks are not a natural kind.114 In contrast, embracing the notion of
intrinsic properties does not, in any way, presuppose that there is a correct
set of lines for dividing the world into natural-kind components.
Regardless of how much matter falls within the frame chosen to delineate a
thing, all things—including the things cups on books—have intrinsic
properties.
However, the physical framing of the thing under consideration can
affect whether any given property is intrinsic or extrinsic. Whether a
property is intrinsic or extrinsic is contingent on the amount of matter that
is included within the thing under consideration:
A sentence or statement or proposition that ascribes
intrinsic properties to something is entirely about that thing;
whereas an ascription of extrinsic properties to something is
not entirely about that thing, though it may well be about
some larger whole which includes that thing as a part. A
thing has its intrinsic properties in virtue of the way that
thing itself, and nothing else, is. Not so for extrinsic
properties, though a thing may well have these in virtue of
the way some larger whole is.115
The things a pencil (“a thing” in the quote above) and a pencil six
meters from a rhododendron (a different thing that is the “some larger
whole” in the quote above) both have intrinsic properties. However, the
particular property being six-meters from a rhododendron is, when
predicated of the pencil, intrinsic to the latter because it establishes a
relationship among parts and extrinsic to the former because it is not only
about the pencil.
Although not governed by an Aristotelian variant of essentialism, the
intuitive idea that some properties are intrinsic to a thing whereas others
are not does, nonetheless, reflect a different and more modern type of
essentialism that infects our everyday thinking. This essentialism is
scientific, physical, and structural: two things are identical if and only if
they have all of the same “micro-structure,” “important physical
(1981) (discussing natural kinds). The confusion between accidental and essential properties follows
from the fact that it is possible to describe a natural kind with only accidental properties and a thing
with only extrinsic properties. Man is man because he is a rational animal not because he is a
featherless biped, despite the fact that the latter, so-called necessary properties pick out the same set of
things in the actual world that the former, essential properties do. Id. at 252; see also DAVID CHARLES,
ARISTOTLE ON MEANING AND ESSENCE 18–19 (2000) (distinguishing essential and necessary
properties). Similarly, one can describe something with reference only to its accidental properties, for
example, the thing that is next to the telephone.
114
See Ayers, supra note 113, at 252.
115
Lewis, supra note 92, at 197.
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properties,” or “determining and basic scientific feature[s].”
The list of
the most basic of intrinsic properties from which higher-order intrinsic
properties like shape can be constructed resounds in quantum physics:
spin, charge, and mass.117 Thus, the most precise list of the intrinsic
properties of a thing roughly, or perhaps exactly, trace the identity of a
thing to what physicists and chemists say things are.118 Reductively
speaking, the things that make up the world are defined first and foremost
by their internal structures.
2. The Hypothesis: The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Properties Governs Courts’ Decisions During Thing Construction
Reinforced by the intuitively palatable oppositions of duplicates versus
indiscernibles and real change versus mere Cambridge change, the
essentialist distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of a
thing may influence how judges define thing-types. A reasonable
hypothesis is that the distinction serves as an extra-legal, conventional
restriction that fills the gap left by a lack of explicit statutory guidance and
effectively binds patent courts during thing construction.119
Because AAT is readily defined in terms of new properties for
preexisting things,120 the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties suggests that there are two categories of AAT. On the one hand,
there is intrinsic-property AAT—AAT that results from the invention of a
new intrinsic property for the already disclosed and claimed thing. Paper
with the property being dyed green with an after-arising chemical is most
intuitively viewed as an intrinsic property, at least provided that the dye is
116

CHARLES, supra note 113, at 5–11 (describing a form of “modern essentialism” associated
with the work of Hilary Putnam).
117
See Dunn, supra note 112, at 180 (noting that the precise mass and charge of a particle are
intrinsic qualities).
118
This, of course, is not the only authority to which deference could be paid to establish what
things are intrinsically. Although the result would not correspond as closely with widely shared
intuitions about the world, the views of a cultural anthropologist could be substituted for the views of
the physicist to arrive at a radically different set of intrinsic properties. Cf. BRUNO LATOUR,
REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY 63–86 (2005)
(developing an understanding of objects that attributes agency to objects).
119
Importantly, it is not necessary to accept the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties as a matter of metaphysics to defend the thesis that the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties is useful as a descriptive tool with explanatory purchase in the task of figuring out
what courts do. Rather, the strong metaphysical claim about intrinsic properties advocated by
philosophers can be relaxed into a weaker claim about shared intuitions and convention. So long as the
intuitions about duplicates and mere Cambridge change, see supra text accompanying notes 104–09
(explaining these intuitions), that are derived from the scientific, physical essentialism are real in the
minds of judges and patent litigants, the impact of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties on how courts construct things can be real. Using the terms suggested by Mike Madison, the
stronger claim that courts construct “things by nature” can be translated into a weaker claim that they
construct “things by practice.” See infra note 239 and accompanying text.
120
See supra text accompanying notes 86–89 (defining AAT in terms of after-arising properties
for preexisting things).
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not merely a superficial coating but instead alters the molecular bonds
within the paper. Two objects with different internal molecular structures
are not truly duplicates;121 the change that a sheet of paper undergoes when
its molecular structure is altered is real change.122 On the other hand, there
is extrinsic-property AAT—AAT that results from the invention of a new
extrinsic property for the already disclosed and claimed thing. The
allegedly infringing sheet of paper with the after-arising property being in
the paper-tray of an after-arising computer printer is most intuitively
viewed as extrinsic-property AAT with respect to the disclosure of the
earlier patent claiming “paper.” The generic property being contained
within something else is not entirely about the disclosed sheets of paper; it
depends, wholly or partly, on something other than the thing to which the
property is ascribed, namely a printer.123 A sheet of paper in a paper tray is
readily viewed as a duplicate of a sheet of paper outside of the paper
tray;124 the change involved in putting the sheet of paper into the paper tray
seems like mere Cambridge change rather than real change.125
If judges are constrained by the distinction between the intrinsic and
extrinsic properties of a thing during thing construction, one would expect
them, in turn, to make a distinction, whether consciously or not, between
intrinsic- and extrinsic-property AAT in cases addressing the reach of
literal claim scope into after-arising technology.126
In cases involving allegations of literal infringement of intrinsicproperty AAT, courts would never side with the patent owner. Intrinsicproperty AAT, such as the paper that is chemically altered when it is dyed
green with an after-arising chemical, represents a newly discovered thingtype. The property that makes the AAT after-arising is an intrinsic
property, and intrinsic properties are those that by definition contribute to
the definition of a thing-type. If a claim is to encompass intrinsic-property
AAT, its thing-scope must expand over time. On the date of infringement,
there is a thing within the scope of the claim that is not a duplicate of any
thing that was within the scope of the claim at the time of filing. Building
on the notion that real change would occur if a thing within the patent’s
constructive disclosure were to turn into intrinsic-property AAT, the
growth after the date of filing that the claim must undergo in order to bring
121
122

See supra text accompanying notes 104–06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles).
See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real change with mere Cambridge

change).
123

See supra text accompanying note 97 (defining extrinsic properties).
See supra text accompanying notes 104–06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles).
125
See supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real change with mere Cambridge
change).
126
The discussion in the remainder of this subsection presumes that courts employ the fixation
theory for thing-scope. If courts were to adopt the growth theory for thing-scope, thing construction
might not be dispositive of the outcomes in cases involving the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.
See supra note 81.
124
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intrinsic-property AAT within its ambit can be thought of as real growth.
In theory, intrinsic-property AAT forces courts to choose either the
fixation theory or the growth theory for thing-scope. If the fixation theory
prevails and the commensurability requirements of the disclosure doctrines
require that thing-scope is fixed on the date a claim is filed, the real growth
in thing-scope required for literal infringement is doctrinally impossible.
In contrast, in cases involving allegations of literal infringement of
extrinsic-property AAT, courts would always side with the patent owner.
Extrinsic-property AAT is a token of a thing-type disclosed in the patent
specification at the time of filing, albeit a token that is discernable from the
disclosed things. The property that makes the AAT after-arising is a
property that is overlooked in the definition of thing-types. The thingscope of a claim therefore need not expand after the filing date in order to
be able to encompass newly discovered extrinsic-property AAT. On the
date of infringement, the coarse-grained nature of thing-types means that
there are no new things within the scope of the claim. The extrinsicproperty AAT is simply viewed as a duplicate of one of the things that was
within the scope of the claim at the time of filing. Building on the notion
that mere Cambridge change would occur if a thing constructively
disclosed by the patent specification were to turn into extrinsic-property
AAT, the growth after the date of filing that the claim must undergo in
order to bring extrinsic-property AAT within its ambit can be thought of as
mere Cambridge growth. Such mere Cambridge growth is doctrinally
permissible even if the commensurability requirements of the disclosure
doctrines require that thing-scope is fixed on the date a claim is filed.
Thus, in theory, extrinsic-property AAT represents a type of AAT for
which the fixation-growth paradox can be explained without contradiction.
3. Testing the Hypothesis: The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into
Intrinsic- and Extrinsic-Property AAT
The hypothesis put forward in the previous subsection is that courts
might use the essentialist distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties to identify the properties that do and do not, respectively, define
thing-types during thing construction. If the distinction governed courts’
decisions during thing construction, one would expect bifurcated case law
concerning the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. The inclusion of
extrinsic-property AAT within a literal claim would generate only mere
Cambridge growth in thing-scope. Courts would therefore sanction the
reach of literal thing-scope into extrinsic-property AAT without
recognizing any legally relevant growth in thing-scope, i.e. even while
embracing the fixation theory. However, the inclusion of intrinsicproperty AAT within a literal claim would generate real growth in thingscope. In this situation, thing construction would not mask the growth, and
courts would be forced to either reach a verdict of noninfringement or
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abandon the ex ante fixation of thing-scope. In other words, extrinsicproperty AAT would result in a solution that sanctions both fixation and
growth simultaneously, but intrinsic-property AAT would force courts to
elect one of the incompatible fixation and growth theories.
This subsection tests the hypothesis by comparing the Federal Circuit
case law on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT with the case law
that one would expect to result from courts’ adherence to the distinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties during thing construction. The
comparison supports the conclusion that the hypothesis is at least half
correct, and perhaps more than that. On the one hand, extrinsic-property
AAT always falls within the literal scope of a claim.127 Furthermore,
courts and commentators never suggest that the claim’s thing-scope grows
after the date of filing when it encompasses extrinsic-property AAT. On
the other hand, courts do not treat intrinsic-property AAT in a uniform
manner. They sanction the reach of literal claim scope into intrinsicproperty AAT in some instances, but not in others; they express concerns
about ex post growth when literal claim scope reaches into intrinsicproperty AAT in some instances, but not in others. Whether the structural
essentialism that underlies the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
properties is dispositive in thing construction in cases involving intrinsicproperty AAT remains an open question.
a. Literal Claims Always Encompass Extrinsic-Property AAT
There are three recurring scenarios in which an improver N+1 invents
a new extrinsic property for a thing already invented, disclosed, and
claimed by an original inventor N: claims to combinations, new methods of
making a claimed thing, and new methods of using a claimed thing. In
each scenario, courts always and without exception allow N’s claim to
encompass N+1’s extrinsic-property AAT without even addressing the
argument that the inclusion of such AAT within literal claim scope
impermissibly expands the claim after the date of filing and violates the
commensurateness requirement in the disclosure doctrines. In other words,
the fixation theory never stands in the way of courts’ inclusion of extrinsicproperty AAT within literal claim scope.
After-arising combinations are the stuff of black letter law and
introductory patent courses. An inventor N invents and claims “the
invention comprising A,” and an improver N+1 invents the after-arising
combination A+B (which can be after-arising either because B is itself
after-arising or because the combination of A and B is after-arising).128
127
But cf. infra note 135 (noting that a property that is conventionally viewed as an extrinsic
property becomes an intrinsic property when a claim limitation expressly recites the property).
128
N+1 can file either of two claims. If she files a claim to the combination A+B, she generates a
physical blocking patent; if she files a claim only to B (assuming that B itself is the invention), she
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N’s claim always reads on N+1’s AAT; the presence of an “additional
element,” B, in an accused device never negates the fact that N+1’s device
infringes N’s claim.129 Another way of framing what occurs when N+1
invents an after-arising combination is to note that N+1 has invented an
after-arising extrinsic property for the thing invented, disclosed and
claimed by N: N+1 has inventively attributed to the thing A the afterarising property being used in combination with B. This is an archetypal
extrinsic property because A is the thing described by N’s claim and N+1’s
invention specifies a relationship between A and B, a clearly distinct thing.
The rule that N+1’s after-arising A+B always infringes N’s claim to “the
invention comprising A” suggests that courts always overlook this
extrinsic, relational property in determining the identity of the thing-types
that comprise thing-scope. Courts never pause to consider whether N’s
claim is no longer commensurate with the disclosure at the time of filing
when N’s claim grows in this fashion.
The same doctrine that applies to after-arising combinations also
applies to after-arising methods of making and using claimed things.
When N+1 invents a new method of making a thing previously invented,
disclosed, and claimed by N, N’s claim always, without exception, reads
on the things made using N+1's after-arising process without running afoul
of the commensurateness requirement.130 Here, N+1 makes a thing with
the same intrinsic properties as the thing made by N but with a new
extrinsic property—the property having been made by such-and-such an
after-arising process.131 Similarly, when N+1 invents a new method of
using a thing with all of the same intrinsic properties as a thing previously
invented by N, N’s claim can also always read on N+1’s AAT without
raising a commensurateness problem.132 The property being used for suchand-such a purpose is an extrinsic property. Two structurally identical
generates an economic blocking patent because she describes a physically distinct economic
complement. See supra note 66 (defining physical and economic blocking patents). However, the
effect of the physical and economic blocking patents on the expansion of the thing-scope of N’s claim
is identical. In both instances, the thing-scope of N’s claim to A includes at the time of infringement
the thing A with the after-arising property being present in combination with B.
129
Cf. A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 703 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[A] pencil
structurally infringing a patent claim would not become noninfringing when incorporated into a
complex machine that limits or controls what the pencil can write.”).
130
See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330–33 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(noting this rule in the written description requirement); id. at 1334–35 (noting this rule in the
enablement requirement); cf. Vanguard Prods. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370, 1372–73
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the fixed meaning-scope of literal claims encompasses things made by
after-arising processes).
131
It is not absurd to talk about the property being made by a particular process as a property. Cf.
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 118–19 (arguing that “seeing something from the point of view of its origins”
is a distinct perspective on the world).
132
See B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935) (holding that a claim to
an improved sparkplug reads on sparkplugs used in airplanes that were developed after the sparkplug
claim had been filed).
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molecules of chemical X are treated as duplicates even if they are being
put to different uses. The fact that the useful functions of a thing-token are
extrinsic properties also explains why a species that is patentable over an
already issued genus claim because of the discovery of an unexpected use
for the species routinely falls within the scope of the genus claim without
causing an outcry that the genus claim is somehow expanded by the
inclusion of AAT.133 The species claimant has merely discovered a
nonobvious, extrinsic property of the already invented, disclosed and
claimed object.
Thus, at least with respect to extrinsic-property AAT, the hypothesis
that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties governs
courts’ decisions during thing construction is consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s case law on the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. The per se
inclusion of extrinsic-property AAT within literal claim scope suggests
that courts performing thing construction in these cases are firmly under
the sway of a structural essentialism pertaining to the nature of what things
are.134 Courts seem to view things as being defined by their internal
structures and nothing more. Extrinsic properties do not appear to
contribute to the identity of thing-types; courts never seem to divide what
they intuitively perceive to be a unitary thing-type into distinct thing-types
with reference to extrinsic properties.135 Things that are after-arising only
in the sense that they have after-arising extrinsic properties are readily
viewed as duplicates of the things in existence at the time of filing.
133
See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 806 (S.D. Tex. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“A subsequent species invention, even if unobvious and hence patentable over an earlier generic
invention, . . . does not require restriction of the literal scope of claims to the generic invention so as to
exclude the later species.”).
134
See supra text accompanying notes 116–18 (noting that the distinction between the intrinsic
and extrinsic properties of a thing rests on a structural or physical essentialism).
135
There is an exception to this rule. Properties that are conventionally viewed as extrinsic
become relevant when the conventional framing of the things in question is narrowed by the claim
language. A conventionally extrinsic property can become intrinsic by expressly reframing the amount
of stuff that comprises the thing. See supra text accompanying note 115 (noting that the physical
framing of the thing in question can affect whether a property is intrinsic or extrinsic). Properties that
are by convention extrinsic can be made intrinsic and relevant to both meaning-scope and the identity
of things if they are expressly listed as limitations in the text of the claim. If a patent simply claims
“paper,” then the property being in a computer printer paper tray is an extrinsic property of the
claimed paper. However, if the patent claims more specifically “paper in a computer printer paper
tray,” then the property being in a computer printer paper tray is an intrinsic property of the claimed
things because the things under consideration are paper/printer-tray pairings. Similarly, a product-byprocess claim can transform the conventionally extrinsic property having been made by such-and-such
a process into one that matters to thing-scope. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970
F.2d 834, 846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[P]rocess terms in product-by-process claims serve as limitations
in determining infringement.”). But see Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he correct reading of product-by-process claims is that they are not
limited to product prepared by the process set forth in the claims.”). In the same vein, the function of
an object is not extrinsic to the things described by a claim reciting the object being used in a particular
fashion.
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Growth in the number of extrinsic properties that things described by the
claim possess is not understood to trigger an expansion in the metric of
thing-scope relevant to the commensurability analyses of the disclosure
doctrines. The post-filing growth in thing-scope that does occur when a
claim encompasses extrinsic-property AAT is dismissed as mere
Cambridge growth.
Of course, the fact that courts routinely allow extrinsic-property AAT
to fall within literal claim scope does not definitively prove that courts
overlook the extrinsic properties of a thing during thing construction. The
use of the growth theory is also consistent with the holdings in cases
involving extrinsic-property AAT. However, the growth theory does not
fit well with the way in which these cases are most commonly understood.
Claims to combinations, new methods of making a claimed thing, and new
methods of using a claimed thing are viewed as making the things
described by a claim more valuable, but they are not viewed as increasing
the number of things described. It is commonly believed that literal claims
can encompass extrinsic-property AAT without undergoing any growth in
thing-scope.136
b. Literal Claims Sometimes Exclude Intrinsic-Property AAT
There is no symmetry between the holdings of cases involving
extrinsic-property AAT and the holdings of cases involving intrinsicproperty AAT. Courts do not have a per se rule of exclusion that prevents
literal claim scope from reaching into intrinsic-property AAT. Rather, the
cases in which courts confront allegedly infringing intrinsic-property AAT
are a mixed bag.
Adhering to the fixation theory, some courts hold that literal claim
scope cannot encompass intrinsic-property AAT as a matter of law because
the commensurability requirement of the disclosure doctrines fixes claim
scope on the date of filing and the growth required for claim scope to
encompass the AAT is incompatible with this fixation.137 Yet, not all
courts insist that intrinsic-property AAT does not literally infringe. Many
courts conclude that literal claim scope can encompass intrinsic-property
AAT. Abandoning the fixation theory and applying the growth theory,
courts sometimes expressly recognize that inclusion of intrinsic-property
AAT within the literal scope of a claim means that the thing-scope of a
claim must grow over time. In these cases, courts openly sanction a

136
See e.g., Lemley, supra note 66, at 1009 (noting that a claim can read on AAT if either (a)
“enablement is tested as of the time the original inventor files for a patent” and thus a growth theory is
adopted or (b) the AAT “consists of additions to the basic structure” or involves “new and
unanticipated uses of [the patented] product”).
137
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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growth theory for thing-scope.
However, courts also sometimes allow
literal claim scope to encompass intrinsic-property AAT without
recognizing that this result requires post-filing growth in thing-scope. For
example, consider again the easy cases of infringement outlined in the
new-materiality and new-geometry coffee sleeve hypotheticals.139
Materiality and internal geometry are core examples of intrinsic
properties,140 so the allegedly infringing technologies are intrinsic-property
AAT. It is unclear whether courts believe that a verdict of infringement in
these easy cases does not challenge the fixation of the claim’s thing-scope
on the date of filing or whether courts believe that post-filing growth exists
but that such growth is uncontroversial under the growth theory. It is thus
unclear whether the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties
governs courts’ decisions during thing construction in cases involving
intrinsic-property AAT.
The diversity in the case law can be explained by either of two stories.
The first story presumes that the structural essentialism underlying the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties holds sway during
thing construction in intrinsic-property AAT cases just like it does in
extrinsic-property AAT cases. In other words, it presumes courts always
recognize that inclusion of intrinsic-property AAT within the literal scope
of a claim creates real growth in thing-scope and thus unhinges the claim’s
thing-scope from the thing-scope of the claim on the date of filing. To
explain the courts’ pattern of sometimes, but not always, sanctioning the
reach of literal claim scope into intrinsic-property AAT, this first story
relies on the courts oscillating between the fixation and growth theories in
their administration of the disclosure doctrines.141 Here, the conventional
view that fixation and growth in literal claim scope are incompatible
138

See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In fact, all of the cases in which courts expressly
raise the growth theory as an alternative to the fixation theory are cases involving intrinsic-property
AAT. This observation is simply a logical corollary of the point made in the previous subsection,
namely that the nature of extrinsic properties as properties not tied up with what makes a thing the
thing itself means that courts and commentators do not view fixation and growth as incompatible when
extrinsic-property AAT is at issue.
139
See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.
140
See supra text accompanying notes 94–96 (defining intrinsic properties). Coffee sleeves made
of different materials and geometries are not strict duplicates, see supra text accompanying notes 104–
06 (contrasting duplicates with indiscernibles), and the change required to transform the materiality or
shape of a coffee sleeve is real change, see supra text accompanying notes 107–09 (contrasting real
change with mere Cambridge change).
141
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the fixation
and growth theories in the disclosure doctrines). Courts’ pattern in the intrinsic-property AAT cases
may also be influenced by the conflict between the fixation and growth theories in meaning-scope. See
supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. Courts may be sanctioning the growth theory as it pertains
to thing-scope, but both presuming that growth in thing-scope entails growth in meaning-scope and
adhering to a fixation theory as it pertains to meaning-scope. Cf. infra Part IV (arguing that the
meaning of meaning determines whether the fixation of meaning-scope entails the fixation of thingscope).
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prevails.
In contrast, a second story suggests that courts are not always under the
sway of structural essentialism during thing construction and that they use
some other principle to set the granularity of things. Perhaps judges do not
always feel bound to make all of the intrinsic properties of a thing relevant
to the identity of a thing-type. Courts may overlook selected intrinsic
properties during thing construction and thereby sanction the reach of a
claim with a fixed thing-scope into intrinsic-property AAT. Courts may
treat a property that should be intrinsic-property AAT in an essentialist
worldview as though it were extrinsic-property AAT. That is, they may
generate a category of ersatz extrinsic-property AAT, placing tokens of
things with distinct intrinsic properties into the same conceptual thing-type
basket. This second story suggests that courts use a one-way ratchet to
adjust the granularity of things away from its essentialist mooring during
thing construction: the existence of ersatz extrinsic properties means that
thing-types can be coarser than the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic properties suggests they should be, but the absence of ersatz
intrinsic properties means that thing-types cannot be made finer than the
distinction suggests. This story also offers a both-and solution, explaining
how courts can transform what should be real growth in thing-scope into
mere Cambridge growth so as to achieve both the ex ante fixation of thingscope and the inclusion of intrinsic-property AAT within the scope of a
literal claim.
Clearly, it is impossible to know for certain which of these stories
explains the mixed bag of holdings and rationales in cases involving
allegations that literal claim scope reaches into intrinsic-property AAT.142
If a court has a sense of what the outcome of a case should be, the court
can either oscillate between the fixation and growth theories or generate
ersatz extrinsic-properties to achieve the desired outcome.143 Given the
dominance of the fixation and growth theories in contemporary discourse
about patent protection,144 the only point that can be made here is that the
option of policy-driven ersatz extrinsic properties should not be
categorically disregarded. Courts may use thing construction as a policy
lever.145 They may ratchet down the granularity of things from the
essentialist mooring provided by the distinction between intrinsic and
142

A thesis about which of these two stories is descriptively more accurate would require at least
a more detailed descriptive analysis of case law and most likely an entirely different type of analysis
aimed at understanding the unexpressed cognitive processes of judges.
143
Another way of stating this fact is that the court can use either oscillation between the fixation
and growth theories or thing construction as a policy lever. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra
note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use doctrinal policy levers).
144
See supra text accompanying notes 3–11 (introducing the dominant growth and fixation
theories).
145
See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use
doctrinal policy levers).
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extrinsic properties so as to achieve a both-and solution to the fixationgrowth paradox and shape the reach of literal claim scope into intrinsicproperty AAT.
In fact, the notion that courts generate ersatz extrinsic properties and
treat real growth in thing-scope as though it were mere Cambridge growth
is arguably better at explaining intuitions about patent protection in at least
some situations in which literal claim scope reaches into intrinsic-property
AAT. For example, consider again the hypothetical claim to “paper” and
an allegedly infringing sheet of paper with the property being dyed with
after-arising chemical X.146 Consider two variants of this hypothetical: one
in which the after-arising chemical alters the chemical structure of the
paper, incorporating itself into the molecular structure of the paper’s fibers,
and one in which the after-arising chemical simply coats the exterior of the
pre-existing paper. The latter, “coating” variant of the hypothetical is a
clear example of extrinsic-property AAT. It is akin to the type of AAT
generated by a combination claim: the AAT is simply the same old paper
disclosed in the specification of the patent claiming “paper” that has been
put into a new relation with a later-developed technology. Its inclusion in
the claim to “paper” generates only mere Cambridge growth in thingscope, and such growth is always masked through thing construction. In
contrast, the former, “chemically integral” variant is a clear example of
intrinsic-property AAT. According to a worldview dominated by
structural essentialism, the AAT is a thing that is distinct from the things
disclosed in the patent claiming “paper.” Yet, despite the fact that the
former is extrinsic-property AAT and the latter is intrinsic-property AAT,
courts may not make a sharp conceptual distinction between the two
variants. To the extent that the difference between the two variants is
viewed as insubstantial, the case for believing that courts do sometimes use
ersatz extrinsic-property AAT becomes stronger. Sometimes, what things
are structurally does not seem to matter. This perception suggests that
thing construction is not always governed by the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic properties and that thing construction is at least
sometimes used as a policy lever for adjusting the granularity of things and
shaping the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.
IV. THE MEANING OF MEANING
The previous Part demonstrated how courts can construct things so as
to fix thing-scope on the date of filing and still allow literal claims to grow
after filing so as to encompass AAT. This Part explores a second, and
analytically independent, mechanism through which courts can achieve a
both-and solution of fixation and growth. By adopting the appropriate
146

See supra text accompanying notes 84, 90, 126.

2008]

THE REACH OF LITERAL CLAIM SCOPE

537

definition for meaning, courts can sanction play between thing-scope and
meaning-scope: even if the thing-scope of a claim grows after the date of
filing, meaning-scope may remain fixed on the date of filing.147
Part IV.A demonstrates that the meaning of meaning is ambiguous.
Denotational meaning, or reference, derives from relationships between
words and things in the world, whereas ideational meaning, or sense,
derives from relationships between words.148 Part IV.B demonstrates the
practical implications of this ambiguity. The court’s choice of how to
define the meaning of meaning in claim construction determines whether a
claim with a meaning-scope fixed on the date of filing can literally
encompass AAT that expands the claim’s thing-scope.
Because
denotational meaning links words to things, courts that stabilize
denotational meaning on the date of filing necessarily stabilize both
meaning-scope and thing-scope on the date of filing in the same fell
swoop. Denotational meaning forces courts to adopt either the fixation
theory or the growth theory: if AAT requires a post-filing expansion in
thing-scope to infringe, either the AAT cannot literally infringe (i.e.
fixation trumps) or the meaning of the claim cannot be fixed on the date of
filing (i.e. growth trumps). However, a court that stabilizes ideational
meaning on the date of filing can reach a both-and solution. Ideational
meaning fixes only word-to-word relationships and thus sanctions play
between the meaning-scope and thing-scope of a claim. Ideationally
defined meaning-scope can remain steadfastly fixed on the date of filing,
even as thing-scope expands over time to encompass AAT. Part IV.C
concludes with a brief overview of the situations in which courts actually
use ideational and denotational meaning in claim construction.

147

Thing construction and the meaning of meaning are analytically independent mechanisms for
resolving the fixation-growth paradox without logical contradiction. The previous Part demonstrated
that thing construction achieves this end by masking growth in thing-scope. Extrinsic-property AAT,
both essential and ersatz, can fall within the literal scope of a claim because the mere Cambridge
growth in thing-scope that such AAT triggers upon its inclusion simply does not expand the claim’s
thing-scope when measured with the legally sanctioned metric for a thing-type. See generally supra
Part III. This Part investigates a distinct and logically subsequent question. It assumes that the
inclusion of AAT within the scope of a literal claim expands thing-scope; it assumes that thing
construction has not been used to achieve a result of simultaneous fixation and growth. Starting from
this point, it queries whether the expansion of thing-scope entails the expansion of meaning-scope or
whether alternatively meaning-scope can remain fixed even as thing-scope expands.
148
Margaret Radin’s work demonstrates that patent lawyers can gain insight by bringing the
philosophy of language to bear on the mechanics of peripheral claims. Margaret Jane Radin, The
Linguistic Turn in Patent Law (2005) (draft on file with Connecticut Law Review) (juxtaposing basic
patent issues with basic issues in the philosophy of language); see also Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 50–52 (2000) (invoking Wittgenstein’s views of
language as an activity that is performed in a community to argue against a “hypertextualist” theory of
claim construction); Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61,
83–105 (2006) (advocating a “linguistics-based approach to claim construction”). However, the
ambiguity in the meaning of meaning discussed in this Part is new to the patent literature.
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A. The Ambiguity in the Meaning of Meaning
Over a decade ago in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the U.S.
Supreme Court identified two steps within the process of determining
whether the language of a patent claim describes a thing-token, and it
assigned each step to a different party.149 It assigned claim construction,
the interpretation of the word meaning of the language, to judges, and it
reserved infringement, or the determination of whether the meaning of the
language encompasses the allegedly infringing things, for the jury.150 With
the power to perform claim construction in the hands of the judges, patent
courts and commentators have understandably focused, ever since
Markman, on identifying an appropriate methodology for claim
construction. In large part, this question has led to a heated battle over the
relative importance of the contextual use of words in patent specifications
and the words’ dictionary definitions.151
The question that this subsection addresses and that courts face when
defining the meaning of meaning is not this common question.152 Here,
meaning is not dealt with as a noun in the sense of the generality or
specificity of the semantic content of a particular word or phrase. Rather,
it is the nature of meaning as a verb that is at issue. The question is not
what descriptive language means but how it means. How does a claim
term achieve semantic content? This subsection argues that the meaning of
meaning in this verbal form is ambiguous. Denotational and ideational
theories of meaning—alternatively described as reference and sense,
respectively—both offer plausible interpretations of the mechanism
through which descriptive language achieves meaning.153
149

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 (1996).
Id. at 384, 391.
151
The Federal Circuit confronted this issue head-on in Phillips v. AWH Corp., but Phillips did
not eliminate the confusion. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For an
empirical take on this methodological question before Phillips, see generally Wagner & Petherbridge,
supra note 24.
152
However, the relative weight afforded to the specification and dictionaries can also influence
the reach of literal claim scope into AAT. See, e.g., Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enter., Inc., 358
F.3d 870, 896–98 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of a denotational claim
construction in part because “the preferred, proper sources of interpretation [are] the disclosure,
technical dictionaries, prior art patents, and expert testimony” and the disclosure necessarily only
conveys possible things accessible to the PHOSITA at the time of filing). The definition of meaning
addressed here is also distinct from the construction required to determine the size of the “chunk” of
text of a patent claim that should constitute a single limitation. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 41–46 (2005).
153
Variations on this distinction have a long and pedigreed history that is generally traced to
Gottlob Frege’s 1892 essay On Sense and Reference. TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS OF GOTTLOB FREGE 56 (Peter Geach & Max Black eds., 1952). However, the linguistic and
philosophical terminology used in this Article is not used by all scholars of language in the same way.
Cf. MICHAEL DEVITT & KIM STERELNY, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 34 (1987) (“One should be on the lookout for different technical usages
among semanticists.”); JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 7–8 (1995)
(discussing the regimentation and extension of meaning in linguistic metalanguage). There is no
150
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1. Denotational Meaning
A denotational theory of meaning posits that descriptive word
meanings follow from a relationship between a word and the objects or
actions that the word describes. Denotationally speaking, words “can be
readily defined by identifying what they stand for” in the world.154
Denotational meaning is often used interchangeably with the notion of
reference. Reference is the link between language, our medium of
communication, and the objective world, that about which communication
occurs.155 “Reference is concerned with designating entities in the world
by linguistic means.”156 (To mimic the language commonly employed to
claim mechanical inventions in patent practice, “the distal term of the
relation of reference”157 is an object, and the proximal term is language.)
From the perspective of a scholar of language, reference addresses “how
language ‘hooks on to’ the extralinguistic world.”158 In sum, a descriptive
expression achieves denotational meaning because it refers to a generic
class of objects or a set of thing-types.159
In the terminology of logic, a follower of a denotational theory of
meaning believes that words stand for the term’s extension, that is, the
class of objects to which the term applies.160 The extension of a term is
“[i]ts range as measured by the number of objects which it . . . contains
under it.”161 To adopt an extensional approach to meaning is “to attempt to
correlate expressions in language with aspects of the world.”162
Although intuitive in its go-for-the-jugular approach to meaning, an
advocate of a strictly denotational theory of meaning that localizes
meaning in the link between descriptive words and real-world objects must
grapple with a problem arising from the empirically limited number of
objects that exist in the world around us. There is the problem of empty
universal lexicon for discussing the meaning of meaning.
154
LYONS, supra note 153, at 75.
155
Some linguists distinguish reference and denotation to allow the former to address the
“utterance-dependent” part of an expression’s meaning. See LYONS, supra note 153, at 79; cf. DEVITT
& STERELNY, supra note 153, at 34 (noting different uses of the term ‘refer’ among British and
American philosophers).
156
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 305. A more cautious theory of reference questions the mind’s
access to an “objective world” independent from language-based conceptual structures. Id. at 306;
DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 199–200; cf. LYONS, supra note 153, at 324–25 (discussing
“the viewpoint of naive realism, according to which the ontological structure of the world is objectively
independent both of perception and cognition and also of language . . . .”).
157
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 306.
158
Id. at 301; LYONS, supra note 153, at 76.
159
Patent claims use language to achieve generic reference, or reference to a class of objects,
rather than definite or indefinite reference to a particular object in the class. See CRUSE, supra note 26,
at 306–12 (distinguishing definite, indefinite, and generic reference).
160
K. CODELL CARTER, A FIRST COURSE IN LOGIC 71 (2004); CRUSE, supra note 26, at 21–22;
LYONS, supra note 153, at 301.
161
5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 8b).
162
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 21.
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terms.
Many descriptive words and phrases have meaning, yet there are
no objects in the tangible world to which they connect. “Unicorn” is not a
meaningless term. Yet, if extension in the world around us were equated
with meaning through reference, the meaningfulness of “unicorn” would
be in jeopardy because it cannot obtain its meaning by standing for an
object in our world. There is also the problem of terms that refer to
coextensive sets of objects but that do not always have interchangeable
meanings. If the extension of a descriptive word in the actual world is the
sole determinate of meaning and two terms refer to the same objects,
explanations of why the two terms that refer to coextensive sets of objects
are not completely interchangeable are difficult to come by. For example,
“[t]he property of being human and the property of being a featherless
biped have (we may presume) the same extension, yet they are distinct
properties.”164
To address these problems, some proponents of denotation and
reference as the locus of descriptive meaning “enrich ontology (our view
of the sorts of things that exist)” and introduce the notion of possible
worlds.165 According to possible-world theorists, speakers inhabit the
actual world, but worlds other than this actual world may be at the distal
end of reference. “We begin with the idea of the totality of the possible
worlds across which all of the genuine possibilities . . . are represented.
One of these possible worlds—the actual world—is special, closer to our
hearts and distinguished somehow from the others that are ‘merely’
possible.”166 The meaning of a generic descriptive expression is then
achieved by quantifying over all possible worlds and identifying the set of
objects to which the word refers in our actual world and other possible
worlds as well. “The simplest plan is to take a property just as the set of all
its instances—all of them, this- or other-worldly alike. Thus the property
of being a donkey comes out as the set of all donkeys, the donkeys of other
worlds along with the donkeys of ours.”167 Thus, the word “unicorn” has
163
See, e.g., DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 27–28 (discussing the term “James Bond”
as an “empty name” that does not have a real-world referent).
164
JOHN DIVERS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 9–10 (2002); see also LEWIS, supra note 106, at 50 (noting
that the property of having a heart and having a kidney are different properties although both properties
refer to the same set of creatures in our world); LYONS, supra note 153, at 300–01 (discussing
referential opacity).
165
DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 30–32; see also LYONS, supra note 153, at 230–31
(presenting “possible worlds” as a useful concept for dealing with the problems created by referential
opacity and terms that do not denote anything). Systems of thought employing possibilia may involve
either the quantification of possibilities over entire worlds or the quantification over possible
individuals in a world. See LEWIS, supra note 106, at 8 (“As other worlds are alternative possibilities
for an entire world, so the parts of other worlds are alternative possibilities for lesser individuals.”).
This Article uses the rhetoric of possible worlds and individuals/objects interchangeably.
166
DIVERS, supra note 164, at 5.
167
LEWIS, supra note 106, at 50–51; see also DIVERS, supra note 164, at 32 (“[Possible-world
discourse] may be applied to serve . . . the aim of ontological identification in which [it] articulates the
identification of some familiar kind of entity as a certain kind of construct out of possible worlds.”); id.
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meaning because unicorns do exist at some non-actual, possible worlds,
and “divergence in the extension at some possible world—where there are
featherless bipeds that are not human—ensures that being human is not the
same property as being a featherless biped.”168 In sum, denotational
meaning is a set-theoretical construction comprised of possible things, both
this-worldly and other-worldly.
2. Ideational Meaning
Where denotation lodges the mechanism of meaning in a link between
words and things beyond the realm of linguistics, sense posits that meaning
is first and foremost an affair of the human mind.169 Sense supports an
ideational or mentalistic theory of meaning—one proposing that “the
meaning of an expression is the idea, or concept, associated with it in the
mind of anyone who knows and understands the expression”—rather than
the referential or denotational theory discussed previously—one proposing
that “the meaning of an expression is what it refers to . . . or stands for.”170
Where denotation involves “word-to-world” links, sense involves
“word-to-word” links.171 The ideational meaning of an expression is
determined by the links the expression has with one or more other
expressions “in a complex multi-dimensional network.”172 The links
specify different relations such as “is a kind of, is a part of, [or] is used for”
between the expressions at the nodes.173 For example, the node “bachelor”
is defined by a relationship of hyponymy—or entailment—with the nodes
“unmarried,” “adult,” and “man,”174 and “red” is defined in part by a
relationship of incompatibility with “blue.”175 Sense is sometimes thought
of as dictionary meaning because dictionaries define words by specifying
their relationships to other words.176
at 51 (“The properties . . . are all and only the subsets of the set of all individuals.”).
168
DIVERS, supra note 164, at 10. This still leaves the problem of words that are different in
important ways yet that describe coextensive sets in all possible worlds, like “triangular” and
“trilateral.” Because the economic effect of patent law depends entirely on thing-scope at the end of
the day, see supra text accompanying note 30, this problem is not a pressing one here.
169
See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 22 (depicting intensional meaning as a mental representation).
170
LYONS, supra note 153, at 40.
171
Id. at 101.
172
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127; see also LYONS, supra note 153, at 80 (“The sense of an
expression may be defined as the set, or network, of sense-relations that hold between it and other
expressions of the same language.”). A modified formulation of sense locates the meaning-giving
relationships not between words but between concepts. See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127–29
(discussing word-concept mapping). Although the difference between the expression- and conceptbased approaches to sense has important implications for the relationship between language and
thought, it is not relevant to the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.
173
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127.
174
LYONS, supra note 153, at 125–26, 128; see also CRUSE, supra note 26, at 150–51 (noting that
“apple is a hyponym of fruit”).
175
LYONS, supra note 153, at 128; see also CRUSE, supra note 26, at 165 (noting that properties
that are incompatibles “cannot be simultaneously present”).
176
LYONS, supra note 153, at 77–78.
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Again borrowing from the terminology of logic, sense offers meaning
to a term by invoking the term’s intension—the set of abstract properties
by virtue of which any particular object is placed in the term’s extension.177
In the schema of an ideationalist, properties are not reducible to
quantifications over possible worlds. They are abstract entities in their
own right that can be subject to independent semantic analysis.
B. Claim Construction and the Historical Fixation of Meaning-Scope
In everyday communication, people get by fine with the ambiguity in
the meaning of meaning. Both denotation and sense provide passable
accounts of how descriptive language operates. “There is not an unfamiliar
tradeoff . . . between nonfactual possibles and intensions . . . given either,
we may be able to construct the other or to do the work that was supposed
to be done by talking about the other.”178 Nor are the two mutually
exclusive. A scholar of sense need not “deny that there are (presumably
important) relations between linguistic forms and extralinguistic reality”;
she may pragmatically “assum[e] that the most direct connections of
linguistic forms . . . are with conceptual structures, and until these are
sorted out, there is little hope of making progress with the more indirect
links with the outside world.”179
Claim construction, however, is not everyday communication. Claim
construction artificially fixes meaning on the historical date on which a
This difference from everyday communication
claim is made.180
transforms the difference between ideational and denotational meaning into
a difference that makes a difference in the ability of a claim with a fixed
meaning-scope to encompass AAT that must expand thing-scope if it is to
infringe.
Fixation of denotational meaning concretizes word-to-world
relationships. It defines meaning-scope in terms of thing-scope. Courts fix
meaning-scope by fixing the extension of the set of things to which the
claim refers. Courts that construe claims denotationally must choose
between the fixation and growth theories: either meaning is fixed on the
date of filing or meaning can grow in the manner required for a claim to
encompass AAT that expands thing-scope.
In contrast, fixation of ideational meaning operates only on a
conceptual plane and rigidifies only word-to-word relationships. It fixes
only the intension of the set of things that comprises thing-scope or the
177

at 22.

CARTER, supra note 160, at 71; LYONS, supra note 153, at 81; see also CRUSE, supra note 26,

178
Robert Merrihew Adams, Theories of Actuality, in THE POSSIBLE AND THE ACTUAL 190, 207
(Michael J. Loux ed., 1979).
179
CRUSE, supra note 26, at 127; see also DEVITT & STERELNY, supra note 153, at 32.
180
See supra text accompanying notes 36–37.
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criteria by which inclusion or exclusion from the set is determined.
Critically, the fixation of ideational meaning of a claim does not require
fixation of the set of things to which the claim refers. Thus, what is at
stake in the choice between the fixation of ideational and denotational
meaning is the ability of thing-scope to expand along a progressive
dimension throughout the term of the patent.
1. Denotational Meaning in Claim Construction
Because denotational meaning is based on reference or word-to-world
relationships, a court using a denotational theory of meaning in claim
construction must identify a set of possible things to which the claim refers
in order to give meaning to the claim.181 More specifically, to determine
the denotational meaning that the claim language has to the technologically
trained and time-bound PHOSITA rather than to someone else, a court
must tailor the set to reflect both the PHOSITA’s technological training
and her position in history.182 Courts achieve the tailoring required by the
technological and temporal biases in different ways.
The PHOSITA’s technological bias makes her picky or selective in the
set of possible things that she includes in the extension of a descriptive
limitation. The PHOSITA sorts through the infinite number of possible
thing-types that she can imagine, labeling some as described and thus
within the set, and others as not described and thus excluded from the set.
For example, to return to the coffee sleeve hypotheticals,183 the
technological bias suggests that “an insulating band” for the PHOSITA of
coffee drinking technology means something different than “an insulating
band” does for the PHOSITA of electrical engineering. The coffee
drinking PHOSITA would include a commonly available band made from
material that is thermally but not electrically insulating, but the PHOSITA
of electrical engineering would exclude it.
The temporal bias does not make the PHOSITA picky with respect to
the possible things that she consciously decides to either include within or
exclude from the claim’s extension. Rather, it makes the PHOSITA
ignorant of all of the possible things that incorporate AAT and that would,
if they were to infringe, expand thing-scope. Because of her ordinariness
181
See supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining denotational meaning). Procedurally, a purely denotational
theory of meaning is inimical to the U.S. Supreme Court’s command in Markman that claim
construction is in the province of judges but infringement is a task for juries. See supra text
accompanying notes 149–50. If denotational meaning is a set of possible things, then the determination
of meaning entails the determination of infringement. However, courts can avoid this Markman
problem by implementing a denotational theory of meaning by determining the ideational meaning of
the claim and then subtracting any AAT that expands the claim’s thing-scope after the date of filing.
See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
182
See supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing the PHOSITA’s technological and
temporal biases).
183
See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.
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and average level of creativity, the PHOSITA immersed in a historical
context cannot conceive of or imagine such AAT. In possible world
discourse, the notion of possible things that lie beyond the grasp of an
individual is conveyed through the term of art accessibility. Accessibility
uses the standpoint of the actual world of a particular speaker or thinker to
restrict the set of possible worlds over which the quantification of sets
occurs.184 It has a wide variety of applications, but, as relevant to the task
at hand, it is responsible for making people who sort identically to
associate different extensions with a claim when they quantify over
different sets of possible worlds.185 The position of the PHOSITA within
her own world—the world of the date on which a claim is filed—means
that there are possible things that are inaccessible to her yet accessible to
today’s PHOSITA. Even though today’s and yesterday’s PHOSITA sort
possible things in an identical manner, the two PHOSITAs might reach
different denotational meanings because today’s PHOSITA can access, and
thus sort through, a larger group of possible worlds and things. To use a
common example from patent opinions that discuss AAT, Velcro® is a
possible thing that was inaccessible to a PHOSITA in the art of mechanical
fasteners prior to its invention.186 The after-arising coffee sleeves
fabricated with nonobvious materials and folded in nonobvious geometries
are also, by definition, inaccessible possible things in all of their
particularities to the time-bound PHOSITA of coffee sleeves on the date
the claim to “paper” is filed.187
2. Ideational Meaning in Claim Construction
A court using an ideational theory of meaning in claim construction
views the claim language as a node in a network of other expressions. To
define the meaning of a particular claim term, the court must identify the
inter-nodal links that tie an expression into the network of other
Unlike denotational meaning, ideational meaning
expressions.188
accommodates the PHOSITA’s technological and temporal biases in the
same manner—by tweaking links.189
To return to the coffee sleeve hypotheticals, the meaning of
“encircling” for everyone might be defined and fixed by its complex
184

See DIVERS, supra note 164, at 8; LEWIS, supra note 106, at 7.
See LYONS, supra note 153, at 233 (“[S]peakers are constrained by certain kinds of
accessibility in their selection, or construction, of the possible worlds that they refer to . . . .”). To say
that the PHOSITAs sort identically is the same as saying that they give the claim language the same
ideational meaning. See infra notes 192–93 and accompanying text (noting that at the time of filing
there is no practical distinction between denotational and ideational meaning).
186
Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
187
See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text (presenting the coffee sleeve hypotheticals).
188
See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining ideational meaning).
189
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (discussing the PHOSITA’s technological and
temporal biases).
185
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relationship of sometimes, but not always, being a kind of “hollow
cylinder” or “ring.”190 The limitation “insulating” might be defined and
fixed in part by incompatibility links with the concepts of “conductive” or
“transmitting” for everyone.191 The technological bias, however, suggests
that “insulating” for the PHOSITA of coffee drinking technology still
means something slightly different than “insulating” does for the
PHOSITA of structural engineering. The latter’s network contains
prominent links between the expression/concept “insulating” and other
expressions/concepts like “building fire” and “boiler explosion,” whereas
the former’s network links “insulating” to “pain” and “fingertips.”
To give the PHOSITA her temporal bias and to head off the possibility
of change in meaning over time, a court freezes the network on the date the
claim is filed. For example, the ideational definition of “insulating” to the
PHOSITA of coffee drinking technology might become more restrictive
after the date on which the claim is filed if scientific progress were to
shockingly reveal that exposing our fingertips to even slight increases in
temperature over extended periods of time has significant adverse medical
consequences. The concept of “adverse medical consequences” would
have a more prominent link in the network of linkages that define
“insulating” after this revelation than it did before, and the generality of the
semantic meaning of “insulating” to the PHOSITA would decrease over
time. Such shifts in the temporally and technologically advanced
PHOSITA’s inter-lexical network must be ignored in fixing the meaning of
“insulating” on the date the claim was made.
3. The Stakes: The Progressive Dimension of Literal Claim Scope
If the same set of things infringed ideationally and denotationally
construed claims, then an inquiry into the theory of meaning that courts use
during claim construction might be of academic interest, but it would not
be of economic interest to patent owners. However, the decision of a court
to use one theory of meaning or the other has significant economic
implications for patent owners over time. What is at stake in the choice
between ideational and denotational meaning is, and is nothing more than,
the reach of literal claim scope into possible things that were inaccessible
to the PHOSITA at the time of filing.
At the time of filing, there is no practical import to the distinction
between denotational and ideational meaning. At this time, the notion of
inaccessible possible things is irrelevant. Inaccessible possible things
cannot infringe because they do not exist in the actual world. The
denotational and ideational variants of meaning-scope thus pick out an
identical set of things at that time. This equivalence follows from the fact
190
191

Cf. supra note 174 and accompanying text (giving an example of entailment).
Cf. supra note 175 and accompanying text (giving an example of incompatibility).
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that the intension of a term is by definition a function for determining the
term’s extension.192 Only objects possessing the properties comprising the
term’s intension are included in the term’s extension.193 However, as time
progresses and AAT is discovered after the date of filing, an important
difference between ideational and denotational meaning develops.
By equating meaning with a set of accessible possible things,
denotation fixes historical reference and extension as part and parcel of its
fixation of historical meaning. Membership in the set of possible things
within the extension of a term is closed when meaning is fixed on the date
of filing. If a possible thing is inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date a
claim is filed, the fixation of meaning on that date leads to the exclusion of
that possible thing from literal claim scope. Courts that employ a
denotational theory of meaning must choose between fixation and growth:
stability in meaning depends on stability in the set of propertized thingtypes, and, inversely, expansion of the set of thing-types described
necessarily expands meaning. In sum, AAT cannot literally infringe a
claim with a denotationally fixed meaning-scope if the post-filing inclusion
of the AAT within the claim would expand the claim’s thing-scope.194
192

See David Lewis, General Semantics, 22 SYNTHESE 18, 25 (1970).
Thus, procedurally, a court fixing denotation may initially determine ideational meaning and
proceed by subtraction of possible things that were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date of filing.
194
There are two types of AAT that can infringe without expanding thing-scope and that therefore
can fall within the scope of a denotationally construed and historically fixed claim. First, there is
extrinsic-property AAT, in both its essential and policy-driven ersatz forms. The mere Cambridge
growth in thing-scope that such AAT triggers upon its inclusion does not expand the claim’s thingscope, at least when measured by the legally relevant metric of thing-types. See generally supra Part
III (discussing thing construction). Second, there is intrinsic-property AAT that actualizes, but does
not expand, thing-scope. The basic notion here is that some after-arising technologies result from the
post-filing discovery of a means of making a possible thing that was already conceptually accessible to
the PHOSITA on the date of filing. When discovered, this AAT does not expand thing-scope because
it was already within the claim’s denotational meaning on the date of filing. It was a possible thing
accessible to the PHOSITA on that date. What changed after the date of filing is only that
technological progress produced the information necessary to make tokens of that accessible thing-type
in the actual world, hence the title scope-actualizing AAT. The existence vel non of tokens of things in
the actual world described by the claim language is irrelevant to thing-scope, see supra notes 28–29
and accompanying text, so this post-filing development does not affect thing-scope.
Although valid literal claims can reach into extrinsic-property AAT, they cannot reach into scopeactualizing AAT. This is true regardless of the theory of meaning that a court uses to construe the
claim, because the obstacle is not infringement and does not result from claim construction doctrine.
(Scope-actualizing AAT can be described even by claims construed with a denotational theory of
meaning, so it can also be described by ideationally construed claims.) Rather, the insurmountable
hurdles lies in the commensurability analysis of the enablement doctrine: if a claim describes more
possible things on its date of filing than the PHOSITA knows how to make (i.e. knows how to turn into
tokens of things in the actual world) at that time, the scope of the claim is not commensurate with the
disclosure upon its filing. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
To illustrate the difference between scope-actualizing AAT and scope-expanding AAT, consider
two scenarios that address, first, a simplified version of the facts presented in Plant Genetics Systems v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp. and, second, a hypothetical variant of the case. Plant Genetics Sys. v. DeKalb
Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A molecular biologist claims a “plant cell
containing gene X.” At the time of filing, there are—and have been for many years—two known types
of plants: monocots and dicots. The disclosure accompanying the claim teaches the PHOSITA how to
193
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In stark contrast, stabilizing the ideational meaning of a claim on the
date of filing does not mandate stabilizing the set of thing-types
propertized by the claim. The sense of a term is first and foremost a
mental construct. It is not the set of things described by the claim, but the
set of criteria that one uses to determine whether a thing falls within or
outside the claim. After the sense of a word has been fixed, a fact finder
can still query how a newly discovered thing would have been classified by
the preexisting, fixed linguistic network of expressions. Because it is
comprised only of word-to-word relationships, ideational meaning leaves
open the possibility of anachronistic infringement hypotheticals that
involve time-traveling objects. If the PHOSITA at the time of filing were
to be presented with the allegedly infringing thing (that is technically
inaccessible to her due to her ordinary level of foresight), would her fixed
mental construct of meaning describe the AAT? Later-developed things
can be examined to see whether they have the properties specified by the
network of sense relations fixed on an earlier date. For example, afterarising coffee sleeves embodying post-claim technology in the form of
geometries and materials inaccessible to the PHOSITA at the time of filing
can be transported back in time as part of the infringement determination.
In contrast, when a fixed meaning implies a fixed reference as it does in a
denotationally construed claim, there can be no anachronistic infringement
hypotheticals involving time-traveling things.
One way to clarify the economic implications of denotational and
ideational theories of meaning in claim construction is to measure literal
make only a dicot cell containing gene X. It does not disclose either literally or constructively how to
make a monocot cell containing gene X. The first scenario involves defendants who produce intrinsicproperty AAT in the form of a monocot cell containing gene X. Critically, this AAT does not expand
the thing-scope of the claim to a “plant cell containing gene X.” The PHOSITA at the time of filing
already knows that the claim encompasses this specific type of AAT; the PHOSITA is able to refer to
monocot cells containing gene X in conversation without being prescient in a way that destroys her
ordinariness. In the language of the actual Plant Genetics Systems opinion, monocot cells containing
gene X are “not an unknown concept that [comes] into existence only after” the date of filing. Id. at
1340. They are AAT that is “specifically desired but difficult to obtain” at the time of filing. Id. A
monocot cell containing gene X is, at the time of filing, already an object of thought in the PHOSITA’s
mental world. Because the meaning of a literal claim to a “plant cell containing gene X” encompassed
AAT that actualized but did not expand claim scope, the Federal Circuit in its actual holding in Plant
Genetic Systems invalidated the claim for lack of enablement. Id. at 1339–44. In the second scenario
(the hypothetical variant on Plant Genetic Systems), assume that the researchers produce a different
intrinsic-property AAT, this time in the form of the apocryphal tricot genus of plants and, more
specifically, a tricot patent cell that contains gene X. Unlike the monocot cell containing gene X, the
tricot cell containing gene X is scope-expanding AAT—the transformed tricot cell becomes a possible
thing accessible to the PHOSITA only after the date of filing. The PHOSITA lived for years with the
belief that all plants were either monocots or dicots. At the time of filing, tricots are not on the
PHOSITA’s radar screen as a possible technological innovation. The PHOSITA of ordinary foresight
cannot reasonably be attributed with possession of the concept of a tricot plant, let alone a tricot cell
containing gene X. Therefore, upon the invention of tricot plants and cells, the thing-scope of the claim
to a “cell containing gene X” must expand if it is to encompass the AAT. Whether such scopeexpanding AAT falls within the literal scope of a claim whose meaning has been fixed on the date of
filing hinges on the meaning of meaning adopted by courts during claim construction.
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thing-scope on two distinct dimensions: a static dimension and a
progressive dimension. The static dimension of thing-scope measures the
size of thing-scope on the date a claim is filed, and it thus only
encompasses possible things accessible to the PHOSITA on that date. As
its name implies, the static dimension of literal claim scope does not
expand over time to incorporate later-discovered types of things. It is as
broad on the claim’s date of filing as it will ever be. Inversely, it is the
progressive dimension that grows over time to incorporate all of the
possible things that were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date of filing
but that come to be encompassed by a claim over time. At the time of
filing, the progressive dimension of literal claim scope is a null set, but it
can grow deep by the time a patent expires. If a claim is construed
denotationally, thing-scope is the static dimension of claim scope and
nothing more. It cannot grow to encompass possible things inaccessible to
the PHOSITA on the date of filing. However, a claim with a fixed
ideational meaning-scope is the sum of the static and progressive
dimensions. It is the progressive dimension of literal claim scope that is at
stake when a court makes a choice between ideational and denotational
meaning in claim construction.
Unlike a denotational theory, an ideational theory of meaning permits
play, or a degree of freedom, between meaning and reference and,
therefore, between meaning-scope and thing-scope. It resolves the
fixation-growth paradox without contradiction: it allows thing-scope to
grow throughout the term of the patent without requiring a post-filing shift
in meaning-scope.195 It leaves open the possibility that the fixed language
of a claim can read on intrinsic-property AAT that expands thing-scope
after the date of filing.196
C. What Courts Do
What do courts mean when they say they fix meaning during claim
construction? Do they fix denotational or ideational meaning? This
subsection argues that ideational meaning is the default but that a more
precise answer depends on whether the court is construing structural or
functional language.197 Courts always use ideational meaning to construe
195
Cf. supra note 79 and accompanying text (arguing that the fixation-growth paradox is an
equivocation that can be resolved by identifying ambiguities in the concept of claim scope).
196
Joshua Sarnoff has characterized ideational meaning that fixes the claim’s meaning-scope yet
allows the claim’s thing-scope to expand as a type of meaning in which there is a fixed meaning and an
expanding application of that meaning. Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming
the Future after Festo, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 403, 428–29 (2005).
197
The functional/structural distinction is a staple of patent law: “the characterization ‘functional’
. . . indicate[s] . . . that an attempt is being made to define something . . . by what it does rather than by
what it is (as evidenced by specific structure or material, for example).” In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210,
212 (C.C.P.A. 1971). However, it is not a true dichotomy. Structural words may be defined
functionally. See id. at 215 (Lane, J., concurring) (“[A] ‘door’ is something used to close and open a
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functional language, but they sometimes flip from ideational to
denotational meaning when construing structural language.
1. Functional Language and Ideational Meaning
Unmitigated functional claim language in product claims has long been
one of the bugaboos of patent law.198 In the first half of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court regularly invalidated claims that used
functional language to describe devices at the point of novelty.199 The
drumbeat resounding through these opinions is a concern about granting an
inventor control over a nebulous array of post-invention technologies that
were inaccessible to the PHOSITA on the date the claim was filed. In
other words, it is a concern that functionally defined claims lead to
excessive depth on the progressive dimension of literal claim scope. As
the Court stated in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker:
Just how many different devices there are of various kinds
and characters which would [fulfill the claimed function], we
do not know . . . . In this age of technological development
there may be many other devices beyond our present
information or indeed our imagination which will perform
that function and yet fit these claims.200
These concerns about excessive depth on the progressive dimension of
thing-scope demonstrate that courts unquestioningly use an ideational
theory of meaning to construe functional limitations in product claims.
Only ideationally construed claims can expand over time to encompass
AAT that expands thing-scope and that was inaccessible to the PHOSITA
on the date of filing.201 “[D]evices beyond our present information or
indeed our imagination”202 are per se inaccessible to the PHOSITA at the
time meaning is stabilized, so denotational meaning would not raise the
concerns that trouble courts with respect to functional language. In theory,
courts could use a denotational theory of meaning to construe functional
language in product claims, but they never do.203
passageway; a ‘nail’ is an object used to hold two pieces of material together; a ‘black’ material is one
incapable of reflecting visible light.”).
198
See generally Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent Coverage: Defining Scope of an Invention
by Function, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1994).
199
E.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); General Elec. v.
Wabash Appliance, 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S.
245, 256–58 (1928).
200
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12.
201
See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the stakes of choosing denotational and ideational meaning
in claim construction).
202
Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12.
203
Stylistically, most product claims employing purely functional claim limitations are written in
a means-plus-function format, i.e., as a “means” or “device” for performing a particular function. The
Supreme Court in Halliburton could have defined the “means” or “device” in question denotationally
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Courts also unwaveringly use ideational meaning to construe
functional language in process claims. Process claims are restricted neither
by the set of instrumentalities that the inventor discloses204 nor by the
broader set of instrumentalities deemed accessible to the time-bound
PHOSITA at the time the claim is made.205 As in product claims, the issue
is not that functional language in process claims cannot be construed
denotationally. Rather, possible-world formulations are merely less
intuitive to courts when they construe functional claim language.206
2. Structural Language and Oscillation207
The Seventh Circuit’s 1974 opinion in Laser Alignment, Inc. v.
Woodruff & Sons, Inc. provides an instructive example of how courts
follow through on an ideational approach to meaning while fixing
meaning-scope.208 The patented invention involved a new method of
laying pipe. Where the laying of pipe had previously used a string as a
linear reference to ensure the overall alignment of the individual pipe
sections, the patent taught the use of a focused beam of light.209 It claimed:
“[a] method of laying . . . pipe sections . . . comprising the steps of [(a)]
projecting a collimated narrow beam of light from said source position
along the selected axis,” and (b) using the beam of light to align the pipe
sections.210 The disputed structural term was “a collimated narrow beam of
light,” and the allegedly infringing technology used a laser to generate the
by looking only to the set of possible things capable of performing the function that were accessible to
the PHOSITA on the date that the claim was made. With respect to claims written in means-plusfunction format today, Section 112, Paragraph 6 specifies an alternative method of claim construction
that approximates denotational meaning. Partially in response to Halliburton, Congress legislated that
claimants may use functional language “without the recital of structure”—that is, with only recitation
of a generic structural placeholder such as “means” or “device”—but that courts must limit claim scope
to accused devices that possess the structure of the device disclosed in the patent specification or that
structure’s equivalent. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6 (2006).
204
See Waxman v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20, 22–23 (1935) (explaining that the defendant did not avoid
infringement by employing the patented process in a different machine); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S.
780, 787–88 (1877) (noting that process patents are not restricted to one instrumentality or machine).
205
See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.03[7] n.625 (2008) (“[A] process patent
claim may cover . . . the unauthorized carrying out of the process on [a] different, even significantly
improved apparatus.”).
206
Philosophers of the possible-world persuasion advocate the use of sets to give substance to
generic descriptions of events or actions by identifying events “with properties of the spatiotemporal
regions in which they occur.” DIVERS, supra note 164, at 10; see LEWIS, supra note 106, at 83–84
(noting the possibility of identifying an event with reference to the set of “spacetime regions where [the
event] occurs”). Courts could quantify over possible spatiotemporal regions as they quantify over
possible things. It is likely the same intuitive difficulty that prevents courts from construing functional
language with a denotational theory of meaning that has also prevented any court from ever applying
Section 112, Paragraph 6 to process claims, despite the express statutory authorization to interpret
process claims as step-plus-function claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 6.
207
Many of the cases discussed in this subsection were addressed by Mark Lemley in Changing
Meaning, supra note 4, under the rubric of fixed versus changing meaning.
208
Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974).
209
Id. at 869 & n.1.
210
Id. at 869 n.1.
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reference mark—a technology that was not invented until after the claim
had been filed.211
The district court construed the term denotationally. It held that the
extension of the term at the time the claim was filed was limited to possible
things accessible to the PHOSITA at the time the claim was filed.212
Fixing meaning on a particular date meant closing membership to the set of
objects that constituted the propertized resource.
The Seventh Circuit reversed and fixed the meaning of the disputed
term by fixing its sense or intension: “The laser beam, like the white light
beam . . . is a ‘collimated narrow beam of light’ called for by the . . .
patent.”213 The court probed the sense of “collimation,” examining the
other words in relation to which collimation achieved meaning.
“Collimation” acquired meaning through a relationship of synonymity with
the concept of “directionality”; collimated beams of light were understood
as incompatible with the concepts of light “emit[ted] . . . in all directions”
and light beams characterized by the “element of divergence.”214 The court
then implicitly framed the question of infringement as an anachronistic
hypothetical with a time-traveling object. If the PHOSITA at the time the
claim was made were to be handed a laser by a time-traveling judicial
agent, would she understand the beam of light produced by the laser to be a
“collimated narrow beam of light”? Stabilizing meaning on the date on
which a claim is made did not require finalizing the set of things to which
the claim could refer.215
The fact that the example chosen to illustrate a court’s express use of
ideational meaning to construe structural language dates back over three
decades could be taken to undermine the position taken here—that
ideational meaning is the default for structural terms during claim
construction. However, no such inference against ideational meaning as
the default should be drawn. Ideational meaning is so firmly rooted as the
default that, in most instances, the presence of AAT inaccessible to the
PHOSITA at the time of filing is not even brought to the attention of courts
by the litigants and thus no robust case law addressing the progressive
dimension of literal claim scope has developed.216 For example,
211

Id. at 869.
Id. at 871.
213
Id. at 872.
214
Id. at 869–70.
215
Id. at 872. The court also justified its claim construction on the fact that the structural term
was used in a process claim. See id. However, this aspect of the court’s reasoning goes against the
grain of contemporary doctrine. Structural limitations are interpreted in the same manner whether they
are in object or process claims.
216
One district court opinion did recently justify at length its ideational definition of the limitation
“an antiretroviral agent.” Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d
967, 979, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he temporal context espoused by Phillips is the meaning of the
term to a person of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. The term in question may be a category,
the contents of which expand over time . . . .”).
212
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Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. involved a claim to an
“information manufacturing machine” filed in 1982, and the plaintiff
alleged that the claim read on a personal computer connected to the
Internet in the late 1990s.217 Clearly, many of the things comprising the
allegedly infringing technology were after-arising things inaccessible to the
PHOSITA of 1982. Nonetheless, the issue of AAT was never even raised
in the Federal Circuit opinion. To the same ends, consider the coffee
sleeve hypothetical involving an after-arising geometry.218 If this case
were litigated, a court would unquestioningly hold that the AAT literally
infringes. It would be unlikely even to raise a red flag about expansion of
thing-scope.
This judicial acquiescence strongly suggests that an
ideational theory of meaning is at work.219
The presumption that thing-scope can expand along a progressive
dimension extends to patent commentary as well. For example, as Michael
Meurer and Craig Nard presume in the context of their analysis of the
doctrine of equivalents:
An inventor, familiar with [a] trend [toward lighter and
stronger rackets], should describe the material used to make
his racket in general terms, and then the patent claim will
literally cover a racket of the same shape and dimension even
if it is made from a substance that was not known at the time
of the patent application.220
Although an ideational theory of meaning is arguably the default,
courts flip over and apply a denotational theory of meaning in some claim
constructions. The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Schering Corp. v. Amgen,
Inc. exemplifies denotational reasoning.221 Schering claimed recombinant
DNA molecules coding for “a polypeptide of the IFN-α type.”222 At the
time the claim was filed, there was only one known polypeptide that was
an “IFN-α,” i.e., “IFN-α” referred to only one thing-type.223 After the
claim was filed, new variants of IFN-α were discovered, and the scientific
community “acknowledged the possibility of different IFN-α subtypes.”224
The Federal Circuit construed the term “IFN-α” denotationally and left the
later-discovered IFN-α subtypes outside of the patent’s literal scope.
“Because, at the time of . . . application, neither [the inventor] nor others
skilled in the art knew of the existence of, let alone the identity of, the
217

Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1327–29 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
See supra text accompanying notes 72–75 (presenting the after-arising geometry hypothetical).
An alternative explanation for the new-geometry coffee sleeve hypothetical is that a court
would treat it as ersatz extrinsic-property AAT. See supra text accompanying notes 141–46.
220
Meurer & Nard, supra note 75, at 1976–77.
221
Schering Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
222
Id. at 1350.
223
Id. at 1352.
224
Id. at 1353.
218
219
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specific polypeptides now identified as subtypes of IFN-α, those subtypes
cannot be within the scope of the claims.”225 Stable meaning was
established through stable reference, and post-claim growth in the set of
thing-types to which “IFN-α” referred would have triggered impermissible
evolution in the meaning of “IFN-α.”226
Similarly, whenever a court broadly proclaims in relation to a
structural claim term that “later developed technologies may not fall within
the literal scope of the patent,”227 it presumes a denotational theory of
meaning. Whenever a court holds that there is no infringement because
“no one of [sic] ordinary skill in the art would have or could have
described such [things] at [the] time” of filing,228 or states categorically
that claims should not “be construed broadly enough to encompass
technology that is not developed until later,”229 it presumes a denotational
theory of meaning. Such statements are inconsistent with the default of
pinning meaning-scope to the fixed sense of the claim language.230
V. THINGS AND MEANINGS AS POLICY LEVERS
Courts’ ability to construct things and define meaning demonstrates
that the fixation and growth theories are not the only options for a logically
coherent patent doctrine dealing with the relationship between literal claim
scope and AAT. The set of infringing technologies propertized by a stable,
notice-enhancing peripheral patent claim need not be reified into a set that
is fully enumerable ex ante or that categorically excludes AAT.
The tendency to reify inherent in the fixation and growth theories is, in
part, fostered by the prevalence of real-property analogies in patent
discourse. Peripheral claims are presumed to “describe the outer limits or
225

Id. at 1353–54.
Cf. id. at 1353 (“The scientific meaning of ‘IFN-α’ evolved with new discoveries.”).
IPPV Enters. v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 595, 606 (D. Del. 2000); see also
id. at 604–06 (construing the phrase “television program signal” to mean “analog television signal”).
228
Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164
(D. Nev. 2004) (construing the term “scanning apparatus” to not read on devices capable of “scanning
by means of a laser or CCD camera”).
229
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J.,
concurring).
230
One coherent category of claims in which courts flip to denotational meaning merits separate
attention. Some claims recite a temporal index like “currently” that specifically references what is
happening at the time the claim is filed. Cf. LYONS, supra note 153, at 227 (defining one type of
temporal index as “a means of identifying the world that is actual at the time of speaking”). Courts
frequently apply denotational meaning—or at least expressly consider doing so—when construing
temporal indices. See, e.g., PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362–64
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that the terms “normally connectible,” “a conventional computer,”
“traditionally connectible,” and “standard input/output port” are to be understood by their ordinary and
customary temporal meanings); Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., 358 F.3d 870, 896–97 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (Michel, J., concurring) (holding that a person of ordinary skill in the art would define “regularly
received television signal” to include both analog and digital forms); Kopykake Enters. v. Lucks Co.,
264 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that “screen printing” includes “any . . . conventional
printing process”).
226
227
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boundaries of the invention in the same fashion as the description of land
in a deed defines the outer limits of the land monopoly.”231 The metaphor
has explanatory value, especially when a peripheral claiming regime is
juxtaposed to a central claiming regime.232 However, it is also misleading.
The metes and bounds of a parcel of land specify the location of a spatial
boundary and therefore identify a bounded set of propertized tokens of
things.233 In contrast, peripheral patent claims identify types of things
rather than tokens of things, and the granularity inherent in a thing-type
means that thing-types can be fixed while the set of discernable thingtokens that literally infringes grows.234 Furthermore, if claim construction
uses ideational meaning, there is play between meaning-scope and thingscope, and peripheral claims fix the only criteria required for inclusion of a
thing-type in the propertized set, not the set of thing-types included.235
Once the real-property bias is dispelled, the false choice between the
fixation and growth theories can be left behind. Moving forward with the
economic import of things and meanings openly on the table, there are two
fundamentally different ways of understanding how courts should
construct things and define meaning. The first presumes that things and
meanings should be entities exogenous to patent policy. This approach
searches for stable metaphysical or conventional groundings for things and
meanings. Courts’ uniform, unerring treatment of extrinsic-property AAT
is likely an example of this approach in thing construction.236 Similarly,
perhaps courts can defer to the understanding of an objective, factually
determined PHOSITA to sort ideationally and denotationally construed
claim terms. Maybe there are some limitations that the average
practitioner of a technology on a certain date understands to refer to a fixed
group of possible things (i.e., to denote a fixed extension) and there are
other terms that she understands to encompass an open-ended category of
things that meet certain fixed criteria (i.e., to establish a fixed intension).237
The second approach to constructing things and defining meaning
231
FABER, supra note 67, § 10:8.1; see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (using a “metes and bounds” analogy).
232
Cf. supra text accompanying note 20–22 (comparing peripheral and central claiming).
233
Actually, the tokens of things within the spatial boundary of a parcel of land can change over
time. Erosion and deposit of soil, for example, constantly shift the particles of dirt owned by a land
owner. Property in land technically fixes only a spatial container, but the spatial container is an
acceptable proxy for the set of thing-tokens within it.
234
See generally supra Part III (discussing thing construction).
235
See generally supra Part IV (discussing the choice between ideational and denotational
meaning in claim construction).
236
See supra text accompanying notes 128–33 (observing that courts never treat extrinsic
properties as relevant to the identities of thing-types during thing construction).
237
Cf. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 967, 980 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (“It is clear . . . that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that the category
of ‘antiretroviral agents’ would only expand over time to include these new agents.”); Feldman, supra
note 12, at 20–21 (suggesting in effect that the Federal Circuit in Schering used a denotational theory of
meaning because the time-bound PHOSITA understood the term denotationally).
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acknowledges that both are concepts shaped in some way by patent policy
relating to the optimal strength and nature of patent incentives. According
to this view, things and meanings are “doctrinal policy levers.”238
Appropriating the terminology coined by Michael Madison, perhaps patent
courts should construct “things by policy” rather than either “things by
nature” (if the exogenous distinction is grounded in metaphysics) or
“things by practice” (if the exogenous distinction is grounded in
convention or widely shared intuitive understandings).239 Extending the
terminology, perhaps courts should also generate meaning by policy. If
things and meanings are policy levers, the categories of AAT that are
designated as literally infringing vel non can be identified, in part, based on
the strength of the patentee’s normative argument for control over the
category in question.
The advantage of thing and meaning by policy approaches is that
literal claim scope can be tailored more closely to the social optimum.240
238
See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 16, at 1640 (noting a court’s discretion to use
doctrinal policy levers).
239
Madison, supra note 80, at 386. Madison suggests that patent law illustrates a things by nature
approach to thing construction. Id. at 411–12. Although the rhetoric of patent opinions is
unquestionably influenced by a thing by nature approach, what courts do arguably demonstrates that a
thing by policy approach often prevails. See supra text accompanying notes 141–46 (discussing the
generation of ersatz extrinsic-property AAT during thing construction).
240
But cf. infra text accompanying notes 250–51 (noting the pervasive uncertainty about the
socially optimal claim scope). A counterargument suggests that the reach of literal claim scope into
AAT should not be tailored at all because patent law should embrace the fixation theory, categorically
exclude AAT from literal claim scope, and adopt a specialization of doctrinal labor under which rights
to exclude from AAT are available only under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE). See Lemley, supra
note 4, at 120–21 (arguing only the DOE should grant patentees rights to exclude from AAT);
Cotropia, supra note 3, at 152, 168–201 (presuming that literal claim scope cannot reach into AAT in
the course of proposing the optimal extent of the DOE’s reach into AAT). Tailoring the reach of a
patentee’s rights into AAT with the DOE does have at least one advantage—the timing of the inquiry at
the time of infringement, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997),
reveals information about the private and social values of the patented invention that aids in the judicial
fine-tuning of claim scope. See Doug Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO.
L.J. 2013, 2021, 2028 n.63 (2005) (“Description can be well accomplished at the time an application is
first filed; scope, however, is often better determined later in time when more information is
available.”). However, the availability of the DOE does not provide a good reason to forgo the
tailoring of literal claim scope altogether. The DOE undermines the public notice provided by
peripheral patent claims. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29–30 (expressing concern that the DOE
may “vitiate” the public-notice function of peripheral patent claims). But see Burk & Lemley, supra
note 152, at 52–55 (arguing that the scope of a peripheral claim is so uncertain that increased reliance
on the DOE would not significantly reduce public notice). If the amount of AAT that falls under a
patentee’s control in the contemporary patent regime is anything close to the optimal benchmark, then
taking the fixation theory seriously and relying on the DOE for all protection of AAT would
considerably expand the role of the DOE and lead to considerably more uncertainty. Cf. supra text
accompanying notes 66–78 (noting the pervasive nature of a patentee’s control over AAT in
contemporary patent law). Furthermore, a regime of literal claim scope that required the exclusion of
all AAT might actually undermine certainty as the determination of what is and is not AAT is a
difficult question that need not be asked in many cases if literal claim scope can encompass AAT.
Rather, inversely, it is the ability of literal claim scope to reach into AAT that should undermine
the presumption that AAT is the “quintessential example” of a DOE equivalent. Smithkline Beecham
Corp. v. Excel Pharm., Inc., 356 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This presumption follows from a
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Courts can set up rules to massage the strength of patent protection when
they construct things and define meaning. Perhaps ideational meaning
produces claims that are closer to optimal in some technological fields
because inventors need temporally deeper claims, but denotational
meaning works better in other fields because temporally shallow claims
are, on average, more appropriate. Similarly, perhaps there are some
categories of after-arising properties of a claimed technology that usually
should be controlled by a patent owner, but there are other categories of
after-arising properties that usually should not be controlled by a patent
owner. In contrast, if courts’ decisions about how to construct things and
define meaning are exogenous to patent policy, then courts are more likely
to dole out identical treatment for pairings of patentees and alleged
infringers who are distinct from a normative perspective.241
There are three plausible arguments to support exogenous groundings
for things and meaning. They are, however, ultimately unconvincing to the
extent they suggest that things and meanings should have exclusively
exogenous groundings.242
First, exogenous constructions and definitions may take political
pressure off of courts because they lend patent infringement determinations
an air of inevitability,243 but this is primarily a private benefit for courts
rather than a public benefit for society.
Second, exogenous groundings may sometimes provide strong public
notice of literal claim scope. This is an important argument. If sufficiently
belief that a patent drafter suffers an unfair handicap in trying to describe AAT at the time of filing.
Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The belief, however, is
based on the unnecessary reification of literal claim scope. See supra text accompanying notes 231–33
(noting that a peripheral claim need not be a set of things identifiable in full ex ante). Coarsely
constructed things and ideational meaning allow claim drafters to describe at the time of application
much of the technology that will exist by the time the patent expires. Furthermore, many of the
restrictions that prohibit claim drafters from describing AAT literally are the result of deliberate policy
choices intended to curtail the patentee’s rights, not limits inherent in the nature of descriptive
language. In a regime in which courts use the construction of things and the definition of meaning as
policy levers, the patent drafter is unfairly or inefficiently disadvantaged at the time of filing not by
after-arising technology itself but by the far rarer phenomenon of after-arising language without which
the AAT cannot be described.
241
In other words, the descriptive generalizations of patent claims will likely be more rule-like
with exogenous groundings because they will be more under- and over-inclusive vis-à-vis the
justifiable outcome. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 47–52 (1991) (portraying rules
as entrenched generalizations that impose costs in the form of over- and under-inclusiveness in relation
to the rule’s justification).
242
A mixed regime is certainly possible; there may be instances in which exogenous groundings
happen to be extremely clear and correspond relatively well to the desired claim scope.
243
Exogenous groundings may be appealing to the Federal Circuit because the court often
describes its role in the administration of patent law as mechanistic or ministerial. See, e.g., In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing, in the context of the utility doctrine, “public
policy considerations which are more appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of
government, rather than this court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and applying
statutory law”).
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great, the benefits of increased certainty may outweigh the cost of the
greater over- and under-inclusiveness that inheres in exogenous
groundings.244 However, it is far from clear that exogenous groundings are
categorically more certain than policy-inflected groundings. Exogenous
groundings promote certainty only when there is a strong consensus about
the correct metaphysical or conventional position. Is there really a single
thing-type to which each and every allegedly infringing instance of AAT
most naturally belongs? Can the meaning of meaning always be
objectively grounded in the beliefs of the PHOSITA? Inversely, a thing or
meaning by policy approach need not turn into a highly discretionary
standard and unleash courts to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. So
long as the policy-inflected things and meanings apply to an identifiable
category of patents, technologies, or after-arising properties, public notice
is not harmed by an express thing or meaning by policy approach.245 For
example, consider the coffee sleeve hypothetical involving an after-arising
plastic.246 When mechanical inventions are at issue, courts arguably frame
things coarsely, treating growth in the number of literally infringing
technologies that possess the property being made from an after-arising
material as a kind of growth that never generates new thing-types or
triggers a shift in thing-scope.247 To achieve this end, courts depart from
the essentialist grounding of what a thing is intrinsically because
materiality is an intrinsic property. Things made of different materials are
not duplicates, and more than mere Cambridge contingency differentiates
things made of different materials.248 Yet, the thing by policy approach
does not undermine certainty.249 The rule that literal scope of claims to
mechanical inventions extends into things made from after-arising
materials is clear and administrable.
The third argument in favor of exogenous groundings is that tailoring
the reach of literal claim scope into AAT so as to further patent policy is
tantamount to chasing the white rabbit down the rabbit hole: things and
meanings can become really disorienting really quickly under a policyinflected approach because there is no consensus on patent policy. In its
strongest form, the argument is simply that policy-inflected groundings are
244

SCHAUER , supra note 241, at 139–42.
More specifically, public notice is not harmed for the members of the public who have learned
the relevant patent doctrine.
246
See supra text accompanying note 72–75 (discussing the coffee sleeve hypotheticals).
247
See supra note 75 (noting that embodiments of a mechanical invention made out of afterarising materials can fall within the literal scope of a claim without rendering the claim invalid for lack
of commensurability with the disclosure).
248
See supra text accompanying notes 104–09 (discussing the distinctions between duplicates and
indiscernibles, and real change and mere Cambridge change).
249
The rule is readily justified on policy grounds: the ex ante incentive to invent (or the ex post
incentives to commercialize and innovate) would be too paltry if competitors could design around a
mechanical patent every time an after-arising material is developed.
245
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just as likely to decrease the optimality of patent protection as they are to
increase it given the margin of error in the contemporary estimate of the
nature and strength of the incentives that the patent regime should be
providing to promote efficiency. This argument raises an important point
that should not lightly be glossed over. The exposition in this Article of
how courts construct things and define meaning is not intended to be a
silver bullet for perfecting the reach of literal claim scope into AAT.
Neither the construction of things nor the definition of meaning provides
the form or model of the justifiable patent scope to which the protection
should be tailored. What conduct should patent protection incentivize: the
generation of inventive information, the commercialization of products, the
coordination of technological progress, or something else?250 How strong
should the incentives provided by patent protection be on average? How
should protection be adjusted for different types of technology? These are
difficult questions that one cannot answer solely through a technical
analysis of thing construction and the meaning of meaning. These
concepts are tools one can use to achieve ends, not ends in themselves.
Nonetheless, it should not be the difficulty of the task that deters the
creation of a more economically justifiable patent regime.251
VI. CONCLUSION
Although patent doctrine requires courts to stabilize the literal scope of
a claim at the time of filing, courts routinely allow claims to grow and
encompass AAT. The paradoxical nature of this situation—that literal
claim scope is simultaneously fixed and expanding—does not present a
logical impossibility. Courts can resolve the paradox without contradiction
by constructing things and defining meaning. The construction of coarse
things during thing construction masks the after-arising nature of AAT; it
permits courts to label the growth in thing-scope that occurs when a literal
claim encompasses AAT as legally insignificant, mere Cambridge growth.
The use of ideational rather than denotational meaning in claim
construction allows thing-scope to expand on a progressive dimension over
time while meaning-scope remains stably fixed on the date of filing.
Once the import of thing construction and the meaning of meaning in
250
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439,
440–41 (2004) (arguing that patent doctrine should incentivize races to claim prospects to increase
consumer surplus that results from invention); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703–04 (2001) (arguing that patents should
incentivize the commercialization of technology); Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent
System: Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15, 36, 77–78 (1958) (laying out an incentive to invent theory
to justify patents).
251
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1066–67 (2005) (arguing that utilitarian analysis of intellectual property rights should persist despite
the difficulty of identifying their optimal configuration).
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contemporary patent practice is openly acknowledged, courts should not
feel compelled to seek out the politically safe position in which things and
meanings are depicted as entirely exogenous to patent policy. Things and
meanings are policy levers that courts already do use—and should continue
to use—to tailor the reach of literal claim scope into AAT in order to
further the normative goals of patent protection.

